Houqua in Chinese and Global History (p.6~13)

Through the lens of a single prominent merchant house and its leading figure, this project explores the economic dynamism in early-19th-century Canton. This study of Houqua and the Canton trade system adopts a global perspective. Such a global approach, overlooked by previous generations of scholars, seeks to underscore the commercial vitality and transnational exchange during the era of the Canton trade.⁶ Each generation of earlier scholars of the Canton trade has focused on the decline of the Qing by interpreting historical issues through the lens of scholars of the respective eras. In the early part of the 20th century, when China was struggling to find its footing on the international scene, research began to chronicle the rise and fall of various Hong families, but without capturing the dynamic economic exchanges in which they participated.⁷ Similarly, scholars who wrote before China’s recent economic takeoff have focused on the cases of insolvency among the Hong merchants as their studies reflected on China’s prolonged economic struggles.⁸ Balanced assessments of the Canton system have only begun to appear more recently.⁹ Extending the analysis to the China trade of the 19th century as the impact of geopolitical forces escalated, through the individual stories of Houqua and his partners this study explores the dynamic global networks of commerce in the decades prior to the Opium War. ¹⁰

Known today as Guangzhou, the Chinese city of Canton served as a dynamic node for transnational commerce until the demise of the Canton System in 1842. Tracing the footprint of its trading networks, this study includes archival work in Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Macao, Bei-jing, Taipei, Singapore, Boston, Providence, England, and India. The investigation covers genres of literature ranging from business records, family papers, personal correspondence, gazetteers, genealogies, government documents, travelogues, and anthologies of literary works. These sources are highly complementary. Whereas the Chinese court documents explain the Qing bureaucratic mechanisms of the Canton trade and the British East India Company (EIC) databank chronicles the ascending commercial prowess of England, the American records shed light not only on the business transactions but also on the personal stories of the individual traders. The genealogies of Houqua’s family, in addition to tracing the lineage of the Wu clan, also detail Houqua’s strategy for business succession. As the scattered historical records are reconnected, the emerging picture demonstrates the success of Houqua and his trading partners in sustaining their economic exchange on a global scale long before Western imperialism ushered in the era of international trade in the Euro-centric modern world at the turn of the 20th century.

In the early 19th century, certain economic actors in Qing China, especially those in Canton, had become so involved in the world of commerce and finance that it is impossible to isolate their “Chinese experience" from the development of global processes. Their stories, however, reflect not only the “impact of the West," as these Chinese traders were not passive reactors to Western forces; rather, they were enterprising strategists furthering their economic interests in view of the shifting geopolitical landscape. To appreciate the interactions among the various players in this dynamic, multipolar trading world, one needs to go beyond not only the Fairbank model of the “Western Impact-Chinese Response" but also the later paradigm of “China-centered history,"¹¹ The ever-evolving equilibrium in the 19th-century Canton system pivoted precisely around the traders’ ability to navigate the turbulent waters brought about by the colliding regimes. As a central player in the world of commerce and a crucial figure in the geopolitics of the first half of the 19th century, Houqua offers a unique perspective on global development at the decisive juncture when China’s fortunes began to diverge. His story allows us to explore how the divergence of business development on a macroeconomic scale pivoted around the talents and inclinations of specific individuals. Of course, even the most successful entrepreneur had to function within the geopolitical context of his times, but the fortunes of empires were contingent on the strategies of exceptional individuals in charting their course of business.

This analysis of Houqua’s enterprise intervenes in the major debates that have preoccupied economic historians. Much has been written about the Canton system as a precursor to the Opium War and the subsequent demise of China. These scholarly analyses, usually privileging political and diplomatic developments, highlight the mounting incompatibility of Western and Chinese models of interaction and the reversal of the silver flows to which the Chinese merchants supposedly succumbed.¹² The story of Houqua and the Canton trade makes it clear that the Chinese economy did not merge with the routes of international trade with the advent of the Opium War. By the time of Houqua’s rise to prominence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the merchants in Canton had already weathered half a century of geopolitical turmoil around the globe. ¹³ Through the work of the sophisticated Hong merchants operating under the Canton system, China became integrated into the global economy well before the arrival of the gunboats that altered the terms of transnational engagement. Houqua’s ability to sustain his interactions with global players for decades in the field of commerce defies the conventional assumption of an ossified Chinese system that failed to adjust to international developments and that doomed Chinese participation in the integration of the world. By reviving this story of economic vibrancy, we return to the juncture when the commercial equilibrium fell apart with the collapse of the Canton system. The focus on this moment of historical contingency reshapes our understanding of China’s critical role in the formation of a global network of trade and finance prior to the Opium War.

A better appreciation of how the system unraveled provides a new perspective to examine China’s economic divergence from the West during the subsequent period. Economic historians have debated how the West escaped stagnation whereas China lagged behind, primarily from the perspective of industrial development. ¹⁴ Some studies have linked the issue of economic growth to the role of the Chinese state, but few have constructed a comparative analysis of this early period to explore how different configurations in the alignment of the interests of the state and the business sectors led to economic divergence. In studies of the British experience, early scholarship focused on the role of finance as a facilitating device, but more recent analyses highlight finance and commerce as independent activities that contributed to economic growth independent of domestic industrial expansion. ¹⁵ This realization of the contribution of finance and commerce to the British imperial enterprise redirected scholars’ attention to the social networks of bankers. ¹⁶ It was precisely in the successful redeployment of capital by “gentlemanly capitalists" to generate healthy investment returns that the financial sector earned its prominent position in the economics of the British Empire. Such a revelation of the contribution of finance and services independent of industry should have invited comparisons with the East Asian experiences. But thus far comparative analyses involving East Asia have seldom extended beyond Japan and such comparisons have been limited to assessments of the role of finance in the successful transformation of Japan into an industrial power. ¹⁷

As this study extends its focus on the role of merchants in facilitating China’s exchange with the outside world, it also highlights their relations with the state. Existing scholarship on this topic shows that the court in Qing China, preoccupied with its imperial expansion along its northwestern frontier, adopted a continental posture that promoted property rights more actively in the landbound regions where the state had to open up territories rather than along the maritime frontier of the southeast coast.¹⁸ Zelin and others demonstrate a clear definition of property rights in China and the state’s role in enforcing these rights.¹⁹ However, except in cases in which assurances of no state appropriations served the needs of the Qing state for land reclamations along its expanding land-bound frontier, ²⁰ the state safeguarded property rights among its subjects but not between the state and its subjects. Although the state facilitated the use of contracts in the vibrant markets along the southeastern coast, protection of private wealth from the confiscatory state remained weak. ²¹ The constant pressure from the state and the ill-defined financial obligations to national and local needs engendered among successful traders deep-rooted suspicion of any gains from investing alongside the state. Such misgivings deterred cooperation between the Chinese state and the wealthy merchants in redeploying capital toward economic development in a manner that would have generated financial returns to the investors and that would have remained consistent with the Qing’s imperial agenda. In this respect, the experiences of Houqua and the other Hong merchants contrast sharply with those of Western financiers, such as the Rothschilds.²² This contrast underscores the potent power of financial resources for the political expansion and economic growth of empires, power unleashed most effectively when those with financial capital can maintain a certain level of autonomy from the state. The reluctance of the Hong merchants to redeploy their capital in conjunction with the Ding court’s economic initiatives lends support to institutional theories of economic divergence. ²³

Houqua’s story extends beyond the scope of the existing literature that has predominately highlighted economic activities within China proper, His extensive and complicated global transactions required an elaborate system of trade that defies any simplistic analysis of business organization. Not only did Houqua have to structure his business in China in the idiom of Chinese family relations,²⁴ but he also had to engage his international partners in Canton according to Western conventions and to extend his reach overseas by developing networks of trust.²⁵ This study demonstrates that a large measure of Houqua’s success stemmed from his ability to maintain an intricate balance between his commercial interests and those of his Western counterparts, all during an era of transnationalism before the imposition of a Western world order.

Houqua’s business dealings also shed light on the macroeconomic issue of silver flows. This analysis of the business of individual merchants enhances understanding that has hitherto been confined to macroeconomic investigations of the trade balance and Western accounts of the galleon trade.²⁶ Silver was not simply a form of payment; it was also a trading commodity that generated tremendous profits. Houqua’s business dealings show that different forms of silver provided arbitrage opportunities for transnational traders. In challenging simple assumptions of stocks and flows of silver, the analysis also extends to the credit market. Compared to simple aggregations of data at a national level, Houqua’s financial dealings across time and space provide the basis for a more nuanced understanding of global economic development prior to the period when Western systems came to dictate the terms for the accounting and clearance of international trade and credit.

(Continue…Outline of the Chapters)

6 A recent publication, Eric Jay Dolin, When America First Met China: An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs, and Money in the Age of Sail (New York: Liveright, 2012) brings to the attention of the popular reader the global dimension of this exchange. The present study will extend beyond the oft-cited anecdotal examples based on Dolin’s selected memoirs with a view toward building a critical understanding of the business dealings of these global traders. In a recently published monograph, Frederic Delano Grant Jr., The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780-1933 (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014), introduces a different dimension of the global influence as he traces the origins of modern banking insurance across time and space to the Canton Guaranty System.
7 Liang Jiabin, Guangdong shisanhang kao (An Investigation into the Guangzhou Hong Merchants) (1937; rpt., Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999).
8 See Dilip Kumar Basu, “Asian Merchants and Western Trade: A Comparative Study of Calcutta and Canton 1800-1840″ (PhD diss., Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1975) and Kuo-tung Anthony Ch’en, The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1843 (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1990).
There is a similar trend in the scholarship on the Western traders. Reacting against Western imperialism, Jacques M. Downs depicts the American traders operating in the Canton system by highlighting their role as traffickers in the illicit and immoral opium commerce. See Jacques M. Downs, The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844 (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1997).
9 Paul A. Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Enghteenth-Century Chinese Trade (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) and Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007). Van Dyke views the Canton system as a sophisticated arrangement through which the Qing court managed the growing trade and generated significant revenue for the court, succumbing to Western imperialism only after the arrival of Western steamships and gunboats.

10 With respect to writings on Houqua, there has been surprisingly little scholarly coverage.
Ch’en, in The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, refers to Houqua, but he does not prominently feature this successful merchant, largely because his focus is on the insolvency of many other merchants. As for Chinese-language materials, until recently writers have shunned Houqua as a politically problematic individual. His connections with Western traders called into question his political allegiance. His family’s financial contributions to the Qing state’s suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, which many Communist historians view as a harbinger of the peasant revolution spearheaded by the Chinese Communist Party in the mid-twentieth century, rendered Houqua an enemy of the masses. In contrast, English-language coverage has celebrated Houqua’s accomplishments, perhaps too much so when written from the romanticized perspective of the Old China Trade. See, for example, W. Cameron Forbes, “Houqua, the Merchant Prince of China, 1769-1843," Bulletin of the American Asiatic Association 6, no. 6(1940): 9-18.
11 For an extended discussion of this historiography, see Paul A. Cohen, China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
12 The Cambridge History of China on this period, for example, focuses on political developments and emphasizes the system of power in which the merchants were supposedly subordinate to a “corrupt" official hierarchy. See Frederic Wakeman Jr., “The Canton Trade and the Opium War," in The Cambridge History of China, eds. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, vol. 10, pt. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 163-212. Although the hierarchy in which the merchants operated under the auspices of the officials nominally underwrote the system of exchange, the trade in Canton entailed a pragmatic exercise of constant negotiations among merchants and bureaucrats over the ever-changing practices in global trade against the backdrop of the constantly shifting geopolitical landscape.
13 In 1757 Canton became the sole legal port of call for China traders arriving from the West. This system persisted until the conclusion of the Opium War in 1842, when the era of the Treaty Ports was introduced.
14 See, for example, Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973); Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990);
R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Kent G. Deng, “A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History," Economic History Review, new series, 53, no. 1 (February 2000): 1-28.
15 For studies focusing on the role of finance as a facilitating device, see R. S. Sayers, Central Banking after Bagehot (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); E. Victor Morgan, The Theory and Practice of Central Banking, 1797-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943); C. A. E. Goodhart, The Business of Banking, 1891-1914 (1972; rpt., Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1986). For an analysis highlighting finance as an independent contributor to economic growth, see Michael Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism: The United Kingdom, 1850-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
16 See Youssef Cassis, City Bankers, 1890-1914, trans. Margaret Rocques (1984; гpt., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2nd ed. (1993; rpt., New York: Longman, 2002).
17 See, for example, Kozo Yamamura, “Japan, 1868-1930: A Revised View," in Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History, ed. Rondo Cameron (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 186-197. Although he does not present his test cases as Asian models of gentlemanly capitalists, Richard Grace examines the lives of William Jardine and James Matheson against Cain and Hopkin’s model. See Richard Grace, Opium and Empire: The Lives and Careers of William Fardine and James Matheson (Mon-treal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014).
18 Paul A. Van Dyke argues that the policies of the Qing state inhibited the geographical scope of the Hong merchants’ activities. See Merchants of Canton and Macao: Success and Failure in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), intro.
19 Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella, eds., Contract and Property in Early Modern China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
20 Anne Osborne, “Property, Taxes, and State Protection of Rights," in Contract and Property in Early Modern China, ed. Zelin, Ocko, and Gardella, 120-158.

21 Hill Gates, China’s Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
22 Niall Ferguson, The World’s Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson; New York: Viking, 1998).
23 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Four-nal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 803-832, and Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
24 David Faure, China and Capitalism: A History of Business Enterprise in Modern China
(Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2006).
25 Many scholars who have analyzed trading networks have offered cultural explanations that build on the diasporic employment of social devices as the basis for business inter-actions. See, for example, Avner Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition," American Economic Review 83, no. 3 June 1993): 525-548, and G. William Skinner, “Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia: In Honour of Jennifer Cushman," in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 51-93. The diverse ethnic background of Houqua’s trading network challenges these assertions. By examining the process through which Houqua and his partners transcended cultural barriers and established their system of credit to cope with the risks and uncertainties of long-distance trade, the current research contributes to our understanding of transnational networks.
26 Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn, eds., Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003); Akinobu Kuroda, “Concurrent but Non-integrable Currency Circuits: Complementary Relationships Among Monies in Modern China and Other Regions," Financial History Review 15, no. 1 (2008): 17-36; Man-Houng Lin, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808-1856 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); William S. Atwell, “International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650," Past & Present, no. 95 (May 1982): 68-90.

In the closing months of 1842, when the Qing court and the British government had just concluded the negotiations that ended the Opium War, the Chinese Hong merchant Wu Bingjian, known to his Western partners as Houqua,¹ was already becoming immersed in the business of reactivating his trade network. On December 23, 1842, from his base in Canton, Houqua wrote to his American associates, John Murray Forbes and John’s brother Robert “Bennet" Forbes: “My dear friends, / I cannot let the Akbar go off without a few lines to you." The ship the Akbar had served as a conduit for the frequent dispatch of messages and cargo between Houqua and his American partners. As the ship stood ready to return to America, Houqua prepared a note to acknowledge his receipt of letters from John and Bennet that another American associate, Mr. King, had interpreted for him. He had no time to respond to the particulars in these letters; however, he hurried to compose a quick message to accompany his shipment on the departing boat. “I send you by the Akbar about 500 tons of Teas all of good quality, & nearly all imported by myself from the Tea country. I have invoiced them low, & hope the result will be good." Why the rush? Houqua had received market intelligence that the U.S. government might impose a heavy duty on tea imports, but that “ships leaving here [from Canton] before January may get their cargoes in free." He limited his specific instructions to the brothers thus: “If a fair profit can be realized I am inclined to recommend early sales & returns, and with this remark for your consideration, the selling will be left to your discretion." In the global tea market, speed was of the essence. Houqua indicated his preference for a speedy sale of the cargo, but in his instructions to his trusted confidants, with whom he had engaged in transactions for years, he allowed ample latitude in the execution of the trade. “The Akbar has loaded quickly & Capt. D. if he has usual luck, will be among the first ships with you," Houqua hoped.

In this update for his associates in America, Houqua took care to include his intention of also shipping to England, the other important market for tea. “I am sending to London by the John Moore about 10,000 chests of Tea, & about 7,000 of the same to FF&Co. & the balance to BB&Co." From this shipment to England, Houqua did not expect high profits, but he thought “the chance better to ship than to sell here [in Canton] by & by." Houqua understood that his American partners needed more than mere details about his plans for the U.S. market; they wanted privileged information about Houqua’s dealings in other important markets, thus allowing the team in America to coordinate its actions in the global marketplace.

In addition to his export shipments from Canton, Houqua explored the options regarding remittance of the proceeds. He believed that the Forbes brothers would send a ship from America bound for Canton. The ship would “come direct with cotton & lead, and if bought low these articles may pay a good remittance." Unlike the outbound cargo, which consisted primarily of tea for the China trade in Canton, the return shipment would be assembled based on the profit opportunities that the various commodities offered at any particular moment. Houqua would, of course, welcome specie, but even the different forms of silver had unequal profit potentials. “I prefer Old Head Dollars to any thing [sic] else if to be had at or under 6% premium."² In mid-19th-century Canton, the various Spanish silver coins had different values in the market. The global trader Houqua had to communicate the latest pricing information to his overseas associates in order to reap the most financial gains.

By the outbreak of the Opium War, Houqua had already held court for decades in Canton’s nexus of international trade. During the closing years of the 18th century, he had entered the China trade in Canton, which at the time was the sole port of call for Western traders. As early as the 1810s, Houqua had already earned sufficient clout in the commercial world to be recognized as the preeminent Chinese merchant in the Canton system. However, in the aftermath of the Opium War, the Treaty Port system would alter the terms of international engagements for Houqua and other enterprising merchants. Nonetheless, Houqua, with half a century of experience in international business and the fortune he had amassed from the China trade under the Canton system, continued to charge ahead in the world of trade and finance in search of profitable avenues of exchange, much in the same manner that he had since the turn of the 19th century.

Wu Bingjian, whom the West would come to know as Houqua, was born in the thirty-fourth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong, the third of four surviving sons of Wu Guoying.³ Although the Chinese would reckon Houqua’s year of birth as the year of jichou in the sexagenary cycle, according to the Western calendar Houqua was born in 1769, “the same year [as] Napoleon and Wellington," as one of his Western trading partners notes in his memoir. ⁴

Houqua was born in Canton merely twelve years after the Manchu court of the Qing dynasty declared that Canton would be China’s sole port of call for Western traders. The political turmoil brought on by the Manchu conquest in 1644 had intensified the movement of people, goods, and capital along the Chinese coast and in Southeast Asia. The ensuing conflicts dragged on, and it was not until the mid-18th century that conditions became sufficiently stable for Sino-Western trade to be conducted with some regularity. The establishment of Canton as the sole legal port of call for Western traders facilitated a steady flow of goods between China and many Western countries, channeling the various parties to negotiate their interests in the city. These economic motivations, along with the evolving geopolitical landscape of the times, brought to Canton merchants from the West and from elsewhere in China, including Houqua’s family and other enterprising Chinese traders. With their Western counterparts in Canton, Houqua and these select Chinese merchants interacted in their respective capacities as the licensed China traders, the so-called Hong merchants.

During the century that followed, the fates of Houqua, Napoleon, and Wellington, three men born only months apart in 1769, would intertwine. Napoleon’s military conquests in continental Europe would alter the balance of international trade and Wellington’s accomplishments would push British power to new heights. In response, Houqua maneuvered strategically and successfully to account for the changing partners arriving at his port of Canton. In fact, Houqua’s commercial successes owed much to the political realignment in Europe, half a world away from Canton. The political realignment, in which Napoleon and Wellngton played critical roles, provided Houqua an opportunity to build his business and to consolidate his commercial power in Canton. Although he did not command military power or transform the political landscape in the manner of Napoleon or Wellington, Houqua proved to be instrumental in shaping the playing field for international commerce as he steered the flow of both goods and capital. His achievements pivoted around his ability to circumvent the ascending power of the British, epitomized by the Duke of Wellington, Napoleon’s archival at the Battle of Waterloo. As the British military elevated the East India Company (EIC) to a dominant position, Houqua countered by recasting his trading partners. Long after Wellington had thwarted Napoleon’s ambitions to dominate continental Europe, Houqua still remained prominent in the world of trade, living out his last years by holding court in the emporium of Canton.

During this period before the imposition of Western rules of engagement for global exchange, enterprising businessmen had to fashion social connections for the flow of information and to deploy their goods and capital along the sinews of their networks to further their financial interests, all in the absence of a universal standard unit of account or a commonly accepted international court of law to mediate disputes. Houqua, the Hong merchant who dominated Sino-Western trade in the early nineteenth century, was an exceptional Chinese trader. The importance of his story lies not in his ability to represent the experience of an average Chinese player in global trade and commerce. Rather, it was his extraordinary ability to balance his interests with those of his partners from America, England, and other parts of the world that allowed him to play a pivotal role in configuring trade networks as global connections intensified. As he identified and pursued profit opportunities, he redirected the traffic of goods and capital around the world and, in the process, he altered the balance of commercial power on the other side of the globe, just as the Rothschilds tilted the playing field for political contenders in Europe.

Directing the development of trade in Canton, Houqua succeeded in navigating the turbulent waters of international commerce for nearly half a century. His death in 1843 coincided with the beginning of the Treaty Port days. However, his successors were unable to circumvent British military and commercial hegemony as successfully as Houqua had been able to do during the Canton era. During the ensuing power shift in international commerce, the command over the flow of capital and goods that Houqua’s family had once enjoyed would be eclipsed by the mounting forces of the British, along with others of the Western world. This shift in the power structure has clouded our understanding of the earlier period of global exchange when Chinese merchants exerted as much control as, if not more than, their Western partners over the flow of goods and capital. Colored by Western dominance during the later period, any memory of Houqua’s criticality in international commerce (and that of other Chinese participants) has faded to such an extent that today people around the world still remember Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington, but almost no one, even in China, recalls Houqua’s story of success.

In 1769, however, no one could have predicted this eventuality. A confluence of events was brewing that would provide the backdrop for the course of action charted by these three men. In China, as the troubles along the southeastern coast caused by what remained of the preceding Ming dynasty had subsided, Qing subjects living in the coastal provinces busied themselves with the trading opportunities in China’s New World, which stretched from these coastal provinces to the ports of Nanyang, or the South China Sea. On the other side of the globe in the New World of the Europeans, fomenting trouble would soon turn British attention toward the East and create another contending power in North America.⁵ At the turn of the 19th century, in the cosmopolitan city of Canton, the colliding forces of these New Worlds brought together a motley crew of characters whose search for wealth and power would alter the course of the development of international politics and economics.

This book presents an account of Houqua’s business enterprise not only to showcase the economic dynamism in China prior to the advent of the Treaty Port days but also to demonstrate the influence of this prominent Chinese merchant in constructing global networks of trade and finance as the flow of goods and capital accelerated in the emerging modern world. This study of Houqua’s commercial and financial enterprise is intended to be a business history. It explores the social and cultural history of the players in China trade under the Canton system and traces the changes in the aftermath of the Opium War. In following the development of Houqua’s business, I have three goals. First, I seek to restore the criticality of Houqua and the trade in Canton in the web of global commerce during the first half of the 19th century. Houqua fashioned his trading network as an international business enterprise predicated not on production capabilities but on connections and affiliations. Second, I investigate the means by which Houqua and his partners sustained their system of trust and credit before the advent of the international order dominated by the Western powers. Third, I analyze how Houqua’s descendants handled the new system of trade during the Treaty Port era and how the network that Houqua had constructed began to unravel in the second half of the 19th century. The overarching purpose of the study is to trace China’s crucial role in the emergence of a dynamic global economy and its subsequent decline.

Houqua’s business success stemmed from his ability not only to carve a space in the world of commerce but also to maneuver into a central position in the network of trade. That Houqua managed to expand his business enterprise globally defies the notion that the Canton system was a constricting arrangement that confined the Chinese Hong merchants and limited their ability to exert an influence beyond this one Chinese city. Houqua’s ability to adroitly balance the powers of his Western partners and his insistence on actively charting his course of trade challenge the prevailing interpretation of the development of international trade as the unrelenting imposition of Western-style capitalism to which Chinese businessmen and China’s economic system eventually succumbed. Without setting foot outside of his base in Canton, Houqua played an instrumental role in shaping international commerce and finance. The process by which he extended his global reach underscores his contribution in forging international trade as geopolitics transformed the commercial landscape.

(Continue…Houqua in Chinese and Global History)

1 His name is sometimes written as “Howqua." I have used “Houqua" throughout this volume because this is how he signed his name.
2 MHS Houqua Letters, December 23, 1842.
3 Wu Quancui, ed., Lingnan Wushi hezu songpu (Complete Genealogy of the Entire Wu Clan in Lingnan) (1934), 2a:44a. Wolfram Eberhard relies on this version of the Wu genealogy in a case study of the clan in his Social Mobility in Traditional China (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962). The present study extends the exploration into the Wu clan by examining multiple genealogies, which not only provide more detailed information on the various generations but also explain the mechanisms behind family and business maneuvers framed in the idiom of kinship.
4 William C. Hunter, The “Fan Kwae» at Canton before Treaty Days, 1825-1844 by an Old Resident (London: K. Paul, Trench, 1882), 50.
5 On the redirection of British interests, see James R. Fichter, So Great a Profft: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

📖 魏源 (1794~1856)《海國圖志》

📖 徐繼畬 (1795~1873)《瀛環志略》

📖 梁廷枏 (1796~1861)《海國四說》

📍邊境歷史地理學：

📖 張穆 (1805~49)《蒙古遊牧記》

📖 何秋濤 (1824~62)《朔方備乘》

在三佛齊王國建立之前很久，遠在古代，印度尼西亞群島就已遍布眾多強大的王國。

庫/古泰王國坐落在（婆羅洲）馬哈坎河畔。其祭司將歷代君王的故事刻在石碑上，顯示知識和宗教在當時備受重視。

幾個世紀後，西爪哇的達魯馬•內加拉（Tarumanagara）*王國誕生 (c. 358~669)。國王普爾納瓦爾曼（Purnawarman）以其智慧著稱——他建造灌溉系統，保護河流，使人民生活豐富。他的足跡被鐫刻在石碑（prasasti）上。

不久之後，中爪哇的卡林加（Kalingga 《新唐書》：訶陵/闍婆（Djapo 聚落名）王國興起。在堅定公正的西瑪 Shima 女王（674~695）的統治下，該王國因其人民的誠實而備受尊敬。任何膽敢偷竊的人都將受到嚴厲的懲罰。

直到西元 7世紀，三佛齊王國才在蘇門答臘島崛起。這個海上王國控制著海上貿易路線，吸引了來自印度、阿拉伯和中國的商人，帶來了香料和知識。

儘管時代和地域各不相同，但所有這些王國都留下了一個共同的教訓：
「繁榮源於知識、正義與合作」。

* 南朝《宋書》紀錄 430 年”訶羅單”國 (Aruteun: 阿羅單 Ciaruteun 為溪名) 曾向宋文帝朝貢。後來 11世紀修成的《新唐書》也記到 7世紀時的 Taruma 為”多羅磨”。（Dr. Uday Dokras 多圖 pdf 英文詳解）

爪哇島古代主要宗教是卡皮塔揚教（Kapitayan），這是一種爪哇本土的一神論宗教，崇拜“桑·希揚·塔亞”（Sang Hyang Taya，絕對且不可見的神），並通過“圖”（Tu）或“托”（To，神）等化身來崇拜祂。卡皮塔揚教的主要傳播者是丹揚·塞瑪（Danyang Semar）等傳奇人物。它不同於如今更為人熟知的融合了萬物有靈論、印度教、佛教和伊斯蘭教的混合信仰——克爪哇教（Kejawen）。卡皮塔揚教信奉一神論，其崇拜方式類似於祈禱（Sembah-Hyang）。後來，九聖（Wali Songo/Sanga: 爪哇語的”9”）將卡皮塔揚教與伊斯蘭教義結合，使其成為爪哇群島一神論的先驅*。

📍卡皮塔揚教：爪哇島古代一神論宗教
📍神的概念：信仰一位永恆的神，祂無法被感官所見或想像。
📍化身：透過「Tu」或「To」（一）進行崇拜，善被稱為「Tu-han」（Sang Hyang Wenang），惡被稱為「han-Tu」（Sang Manikmaya），二者合而為一，稱為「Sang Hyang Tunggal」。
📍重要人物：據信，Danyang Semar（Sanghyang Ismaya之子）與他的兄弟 Togog 和 Manikmaya 一起，從沉沒的大陸帶來了這一教義。 Punakawan，如 Petruk、Gareng 和Bagong，也是重要人物。
📍崇拜：被稱為“sembah-Hyang”，類似於祈禱，九聖認為它與伊斯蘭教有關。
📍地位：被公認為對全能上帝的信仰，但除了編年史和書信之外，許多遺跡難以找到。

cf. 與 Kejawen 的區別
📍Kapitayan：爪哇原始的一神論，更古老、更純粹。
📍爪哇教（Kejawen）：爪哇文化融合了萬物有靈論、印度教、佛教和伊斯蘭教，注重傳統和精神層面，而非像卡皮塔揚教（Kapitayan）那樣的單一一神論。

歷史證據
雖然難以找到文字記載，但巨石遺跡（支石墓、立石）作為古代祖先崇拜場所，為其提供了佐證。它被認為是一種民間宗教，從舊石器時代一直延續到南島語族到來之前。

* During the era of the spread of Islam in Java, Wali Songo used several concepts of the Kapitayan religion (ancient Javanese religion) in the process of spreading Islam.

This concept actually has similarities with the concept of divinity in Islam, namely “Tan Kena Kinaya Ngapa" (nothing should be done about His existence).

This concept shows that Allah is a Being that cannot be seen, thought, imagined and Allah is beyond everything. Wali Songo’s ingenuity in using local religious concepts to spread Islam turned out to be fruitful when many Javanese people finally embraced Islam.

At the same time, Wali Songo has used the term Sembahyang (Sembah Hyang) to refer to the concept of prayer in Islam.

Apart from that, the term langgar (studio-place of worship for Hyang) has also been used by Wali Songo to refer to the mosque. In Kapitayan teachings there is also Upawasa (fasting).

Therefore, Wali Songo has used this term to replace the word Siyam in Islam.

The use of these Kapitayan terms to refer to certain practices in Islam has facilitated the Kapitayan people’s understanding of Islam as well as made it easier for the spread of Islam.

（印尼國家博物館陳列的 Wali Songo 九聖群像）

讀《海上傭兵》：理解鄭芝龍家族的崛起與衰敗，與一些延伸的思考。

衛城出版了鄭維中教授的博士論文，並譯成中文，即《海上傭兵：十七世紀東亞海域的戰爭、貿易與海上劫掠》。這本書故事相當精彩，對於非歷史本科的人可能不是很好讀，以下是我個人的整理跟補充。這本書至少有三個看點，而我自己於結尾延伸兩個面向。

第一個看點是臺灣在世界貿易網絡中的崛起，其實是中國跟西方勢力的貿易網絡角力的結果。

這個觀點其實從另一本談大英帝國擴張的書–《未竟的帝國》來談會更清楚，《未竟的帝國》裡分析西方商貿帝國的擴張，葡西荷英這幾個國家在美洲作生意，跟在亞洲作生意，有很大的不同。季風若對，在蒸汽引擎普及之前，從倫敦開往波士頓只要四到五週，但前往亞洲卻要數個月之久。

在大西洋貿易上，歐洲人制定新的規則，但來到亞洲，傳統的王朝國家間早就有自己一套規矩，比方說朝貢制度。歐洲人須要想辦法在既定的規則上去作變化。而歐洲國家彼此之間，為了壟斷航線得到超額利潤，自己也是殺成一團，這種時候海盜、海軍根本是一體兩面的存在。這種「誰與誰都在戰爭」的狀態，在歐洲被稱作「重商主義」，不是像今天搞搞保護政策而已，基本上為了轟殺對方的航線，都都要搞得血流成河。要等到拿破崙戰爭結束後，英國的海軍在世界上佔有主宰的地位，才在大英帝國的光輝下宣布進入了「自由貿易」的時代。

回到《海上傭兵》的背景，當時葡萄牙人原先建立了一個連通菲律賓跟澳門、生絲與白銀的貿易路線，而為了干擾這條貿易路線，建立另外一條由荷蘭壟斷的貿易路線，荷蘭東印度公司開始了無窮盡的劫掠，殃及不少華人的船隻。

澳門之所重要，是因為明帝國不許歐洲人直接在中國領土上貿易，但並沒有不准中國商人在第三方貿易跟歐洲人貿易（不過到清初海禁時，這會出了一些問題）。荷蘭東印度公司的「紅夷」開始騷亂中國沿海，便希望略過管制，取得跟中國通商的機會。我這樣講可能又有點過度簡略，但就是在中國、西方各種勢力的折衝之下，荷蘭人才會跑到臺灣來，希望以一條「亞加達-臺灣（轉口中國生絲等）-日本」的航路某程度取代掉「菲律賓-澳門」。

第二個看點，則是「政策管制」衍生出了「地方官把持的貿易獨佔」。在明帝國對於海洋貿易的管制下，沿海有關的官員，不是自己跟外國人打交道拿不定主意，就是自己甚至壟斷了沿海省份間的米糧貿易，搞到百姓災民四竄，但這些傳統帝國官僚有一個共同的特色，就是對當時沿海的海盜都沒辦法，海盜甚至在沿海的村落收起稅來。

在地方士紳都看不下去的情況下，士紳便要求要請「傭兵」，也就是當時協助荷蘭東印度公司私掠「菲律賓-澳門」航路的鄭芝龍。接受過荷蘭東印度公司投資的鄭芝龍集團，無論是船、火器乃至用兵，都不是一般海盜的水準，更不是傳統明帝國已經衰敗的衛所官兵可以比擬的。

而隨著鄭芝龍在沿海打貪官、打海盜、打山賊的成功，取得了一種半官方的地位（叫「游擊」），但因為明帝國沒有正式的預算可以支援鄭芝龍的軍事集團，於是便默許他可以跟其他國家（包括跟荷蘭人通商），甚至在荷蘭檔案來看，鄭芝龍其實可以跟荷蘭人談通商條件。這與改革開放後的中國經濟制度驚人的相似，中央政策對於大部份的投資都有管制，但地方官員卻可以私自跟外商談「特別條件」來招商，官員當然自己也從中得到好處。

總之，這種對貿易獨佔的超額利潤，便成為了鄭家軍用來茁壯自己的經費，無論是後來鄭氏集團積極的擴張生絲貿易，或是想要壟斷部份的朝貢貿易，甚至是鄭成功攻下臺灣後的諸多轉變，大概都是這一個邏輯（鄭維中教授作一些區分，叫防禦性獨佔跟攻擊性獨佔，但基本上都是用貿易獨佔來擴充軍事集團）。

第三個看點，我覺得可能對臺灣讀者最容易有共鳴，就是看北京（滿清）怎麼瓦解臺灣（鄭氏集團）。根據鄭維中教授的考察，鄭芝龍直接被騙去北京當廢物那先不論，就算是鄭氏集團最強硬的鄭成功，其主戰乃為求和，希望可以割些東南沿海的中國省份跟貿易特權稱王。

清朝怎麼想這件事情呢？滿清鐵騎雖然跟南方的步兵交戰時佔有巨大優勢，但有些限制：第一個是在一個地區，北京大概就只能投放數千到一萬名左右，另一方面，一匹鐵騎常常要被運回北京，再投放到其他戰場。

於是滿清在征服臺灣上，大量運用了海禁（遷界令）、買通少數鄭氏集團也打擊其他集團、有意無意地讓不同省份的商人跟鄭氏集團的商人競爭走私、釋出假消息（比方說交戰時雖打勝仗，卻故意放過少數鄭氏集團的將領，讓其看起來像匪諜，引起內鬨）。最厲害的，則是讓要取得鄭氏集團的貿易特權、同樣由鄭氏集團出身的施琅主導攻臺等等。因為明鄭的檔案大部份都被燒掉了，在《海上傭兵》一書中，同時利用了清方的檔案跟荷蘭記錄時局的檔案，將當時緊張的局勢刻劃出來。

這本書停在了明鄭的覆滅，以施琅原本想繼續海禁（來維持貿易特權）但康熙不允許而讓貿易正常化（或說中央一條鞭的實施朝貢貿易更為準趣）作為結束。然而我個人認為有兩點可以再去延伸思考的。

第一個就是通讀本書的話，因為鄭芝龍對荷蘭東印度公司相當有辦法，有些人會可能會產生中華帝國在海洋上尚能跟歐洲角力的錯覺（這也是有些人讀歐陽泰的《決戰熱蘭遮》時會產生的錯覺）。但我們不要忘記，到了這個時間點，是歐洲人跑來中國家門口擴張海權，若非不斷的在科技上跟制度上的演進，歐洲人根本沒有辦法穩定的打進亞洲市場。因此，等到英國在歐洲練蠱的環境中脫穎而出，而要強力開港的時候，中華帝國的體制已經難以阻擋了。

第二個，則是今日中國讓地方官員可以自行去招商抽成轉投資的體制，同樣也是以獨佔利潤為誘因，讓地方官員去實踐北京的政策目標。但是明帝國（其實清帝國也一樣），當官方失能的時候，士紳在體制中尚能自行尋找灰色地帶的補救方法，因此才有了鄭芝龍作為海上傭兵的劇情。

然而跟明清不一樣的是，地方士紳作為帝國中央跟地方的緩衝地帶，在今日中國「終極一條鞭」的環境下，已經不存在了，文革的清洗先不論，因為按照中共今天的統治強度，地方士紳早就被消失了，或是消融到了國家的直接統治當中。當北京的這一套體制失靈，現在的中國體制會如何自救？

摘自：南溟網”再說《順風相送》源自吳朴的《渡海方程》”（郭氏為泉州蚶江鎮石湖村的老船工）

〈東埔記〉：
“西[昔]者大唐，跨海東征、西狩、南巡、北伐，寧靜乾坤，名震四海；著集[針]法更數，識認山形水勢，藏於庫中。據往日大明永樂元年 (或為”十九”年之訛抄：1421年)，欽差楊敏、李崔、鄭和等，奉旨前往東、西二洋各處地方巡視海宇，經開御庫，取出先朝遺書，依法而用。奈因古籍年久損壞，故復重整山形水勢，各處□澳，湊集大全之法，惟三者無載，前大清 康熙甲子歲，奉旨開洋，各處通商，因在江南，丹[舟]往山左，從來山海未有憑據，考取先朝貽[遺]書，設法較量牽星圖樣、海島、山形水勢、水遠近深淺，疊成壹集，持[特]選能識山形水勢，日夜用心研究，視記弗致差悟[誤]者也。”

〈廣筆記〉：
“上古周公諸位堅[聖]賢，設指南法通行海道，往昔逮今，流水行久遠，或有山形水勢，世世抄寫，略有差訛，或更數增減、籌頭差別。查古本汙爛破壞，後人難以比對，登舟從原本抄寫為凖，恐其事廢。余如廣東，後往漳州。吳日波*因在廣東擇日閒暇之時，思其差悟[誤]，另將對稽查考，於是差悟無多，通行較正，更加增減。蓋自天朝南京直穎[隸] 太倉，至於夷狄南巫[里]等處，更數針法以及按[垵]澳、山形水勢、遠近深淺，傳至於今。”

* 陳佳榮［南溟網］(2011)認為《順風相送》（成書：1593）源自［明漳州詔安人］吳朴/吳日波(ca.1500-1570) 《渡海方程》（已佚）。他認為《渡海方程‧海道針經》﹑《順風相送》﹑《指南正法》等係一脈相承；並由《順風相送》﹑《指南正法》的序文，主張兩書作者與吳朴的關聯。

以下摘錄自「南洋記」：

…由柔佛而西，麻喇甲亦係「無來由」(Belayu) 族類。官屬名曰「惡耶」，國王彷暹羅，用漢人理國事、掌財賦。產金、銀、西洋布、犀角、象牙、鉛、錫、胡椒、降香、蘇木、燕窩、翠毛、佳文蓆等類。金錢、銀幣皆互用。往西海洋，中國洋艘從未經歷；到此而止，廈門水程二百六十更。

至於小西洋*、烏鬼國（非洲）、大西洋雖與大塊相聯，西洋呷板來往；語具大小西洋記。

麻喇甲南，隔海對峙大山為亞齊，係紅毛人分駐。凡紅毛呷板往小西洋等處埔頭貿易，必由亞齊經過，添備水、米。自亞齊大山生繞過東南，為萬古屢；盡處與噶喇吧隔洋對峙。紅毛回大西洋者必從此洋出，然後向西南過烏鬼呷 (好望角)，繞西至大西洋。

就中國往噶喇吧而言，必從崑崙、茶盤**純用未針，西循萬古屢山而至噶喇吧；廈門計水程二百八十更。原係「無來由」地方，為紅毛荷蘭所據。分官屬名曰「呷必丹」；外統下港、萬丹、池問（Timor）三處。下港產胡椒，萬丹另埔頭，池問產胡椒、檀香。而噶喇吧甲諸島番埔頭之盛，各處船隻聚集貿易：中國、大西洋、小西洋、白頭、烏鬼、無來由島番，罄珍寶物食無所不至。

荷蘭建城池，分埔頭。中國人在彼經商耕種者甚多；年給丁票銀五、六金，方許居住。中國人口浩盛，住此地何啻十餘萬。近荷蘭亦以「新唐」禁革，不許居住；令隨船而回。

* 是以紅毛呷板從小西洋來中國者，由亞齊之北、麻喇甲之南穿海過柔佛、出茶盤而至崑崙。自呷而東至戈什嗒 (coast：印度海岸)，自戈什嗒而東至亞齊，其海皆呼曰小西洋。人黑白不同，皆西域裝束，長衫、大領、小袖、裹頭、纏腰。國富庶，產寶器、生銀、洋布、丁香、肉果、水安息、吧喇、沙末油、蘇合油等類，以金銀為幣，鑽石為寶。

** 茶盤一島，居崑崙之南，毗於萬古屢山(Bengkulu，明古魯) 之東；皆南洋總路水程分途處。島番捕海為生。產佳文草，頂細而長者，年僅足二蓆之用；入王家，辟蟲蟻，值價四、五十金，次者二、三十金，再次十金；值一、二金者，猶錦繡、布褐之相去也。（南溟網地名索引認為苧盤/苧麻山是 Tioman 潮滿/刁曼島）

參考：《順風相送》(南溟網：1537~1593) 將 Kelapa 記為「茭綠巴」。

《海國圖志》卷 13（1843-52）

東南洋：海島之國。原無今補（全文：維基文庫）

英荷二夷所屬葛留巴島：有二洲相接，一下港，即古闍婆，亦曰訶陵。一曰葛留巴，即小爪哇也。一作交留巴*，一作加留巴

明 張燮 (1617)《東西洋考》：下港一名順塔，唐稱闍婆，在南海中者也。一名訶陵，亦曰社婆，元稱爪哇。《一統誌》又名蒲家龍，甲兵為諸番之雄。加留巴者，下港屬國也。半日程可到，風土相類。華船將到，先以橘一籠，小雨傘二柄，送番目。番目報國王，比到港以果幣進王。有華人為財副者四人，番財副二人，華人諳夷語夷書為通事，船各一人。其貿易王置二澗，城外設立鋪舍，凌晨各上澗貿易，至午而罷，王日征其稅。［宋史·闍婆傳：中國賈人至者，待以賓館。］

又有紅毛荷蘭番來下港者，起土庫在大澗東。佛郎機起土庫在大澗西。二夷俱夾板船，年年往來貿易。其本地夷，則用鉛錢，鉛錢十，當西洋一。下港為四通八達之衢，［我舟到時，各州府未到商人，但將本貨兌換銀錢、鉛錢。迨他國貨到，然後以銀、鉛錢轉買貨物。華船開駕，有早晚者，以延待他國，故也。］華船與番船貿易盛甲諸島。

《皇清通考·四裔門》**：葛剌巴，本爪哇故地，巫來由（Melayu）種也。後屬荷蘭國，在南海中。距福建廈門，水程二百八十更，計萬六千八百里。閩廣間人，浮海為業者利其土產，率流寓不返。康熙五十六年 (1717)，以葛剌巴口岸多聚漢人，恐浸長海盜，禁止南洋往來。其從前出洋之人，限三年回籍，然亦尚有留者。雍正五年，弛洋禁，嗣後通市不絕。

初葛剌巴自明季為荷蘭人所據，委夷目鎮守。漢人居之者，以數萬計。生長其地，曰土生仔。司漢人貿易者，曰甲必丹。人有罪則流戍西隴 (Ceylon)。西隴在西洋中，距葛剌巴甚遠，荷蘭舊國所屬地也。

六年閏六月，為群番所擾，荷蘭力不勝，遣流人禦之。許立功後，令還葛剌巴。諸流人奮勇效力，戰屢捷。群番敗走，荷蘭既有立功贖罪之令，又慮釋還流人，則西隴孤弱。一再令葛剌巴調無辜漢人往代。時有甲必丹璉者，以漢人在此貿易，惟領票輸銀，無調取之例，不受命，番目拘之。被徙者，先後不勝計。

於是漢人大恐，鳴金罷市。番目怒，舉火鳴炮相攻，殺傷頗多 (1740 Batavia massacre 即”紅溪”Angke 慘案)。署福建總督策楞、提督王郡，以聞。策楞又奏言被害漢人，久居番地，屢奉招徠，而自棄王化。今被其戕殺，孽由自作。

但葛剌巴以地隔重洋，恃其荒遠，殘害罔忌，恐嗣後擾及商船，請禁止南洋商販，俾知畏懼。俟革心悔罪，再請恩施。廣東道監察禦史李清芳奏言，商人往東洋者十之一，往南洋者十之九。一加禁遏，則江浙閩廣海關稅額必缺，每年不下數十萬。且民間貿易皆先時而買，及時而賣，預為蓄積，以俟流通。若一旦禁止，商旅必至大困。應請止停葛剌巴一國貿易，此外南洋不宜盡禁。既而王大臣會同兵部奏言，今聞葛剌巴已將夷目 (Valckenier) 黜責，於我船返棹時加意撫慰護送，囑令再往，並無擾及商客之意，宜仍準其通商。從之。

* 清代記為咬𠺕吧。

** 《欽定皇朝文獻通考》成書於 1787年。《左傳》「舜臣堯，賓於四門，流四凶族，渾敦、窮奇、檮杌、饕餮，投諸四裔，以御魑魅」；孔子曾說四裔分指：幽州（北裔）、崇山（南裔）、三危（西裔）、羽山（東裔）。故四裔可視同”四夷”。

（上圖）下港［老萬丹］市場的佈局如下。 A. 是賣瓜、黃瓜和椰子的地方。 B. 是賣糖和蜂蜜的地方。 C. 是賣豆子的地方。 D. 是賣竹子或甘蔗的地方。 E. 是賣匕首、馬來短劍、刀子等商品的地方。 F. 是男人賣亞麻布的地方。 G. 是女人賣亞麻布的地方。 H. 是雜貨攤。 I. 是孟加拉和古吉拉特人的攤位，賣各種鐵製品。 K. 是中國人的攤位。 M. 是魚市場。 N. 是水果市場。 O. 是藥草市場。 P. 是賣胡椒的地方。 Q. 是洋蔥市場。 R. 是稻米市場。 S. 是商人散步的地方。 T. 是販賣寶石的珠寶商攤位。 V. 是帶來各種食物到此停泊的外國船隻。 最後 X. 是雞市場，可以買到各種羽毛的雞。

參考：王大海 (1791)《海島逸志》（旅居爪哇北岸、馬來半島諸港十年所見；《海國圖志》卷 13 亦多引用）。下圖中：北膠浪 Pekalongan (蒲家龍)，竭力石 Gresik；四里猫 Surabaya；外南班 Banyuwangi。

📍高嘉謙（2021）風和馬來世界：王大海《海島逸志》的華夷風土觀（PDF）

📍Medhurst (1829)《爪哇與峇里島旅行記》A Narrative of a Journey from Singapore to Java and Bali (Journal of a tour along the coast of Java and Bali &c., with, A short account of the island of Bali particularly of Bali Baliling 線上版：40頁)