1 A Study of the Structural Context: The Colliding Worlds in Canton (p.18~31)

1.1 A Family on the Move
1.2 Forming the Nexus of International Trade in Canton
1.3 The International Port Takes Shape

Outline of the Chapters (p.13~17)

Each period of global exchange involves its own pattern of connectedness with which the participants must negotiate. The China trade focusing on early-19th-century Canton is no exception. Chapter 1 explores the structural context that gave rise to the business opportunities and challenges in Canton during this period. The chapter investigates how the Europeans’ expansion into the New World and beyond intersected with the movement of diasporic Chinese along the southeastern coast of the Qing Empire and the Southeast Asian ports. Houqua’s family had moved to Canton in the previous century when, by the mandate of the Qing state, the city became the nexus where seafaring traders from the West would interact with commercially savvy Chinese entrepreneurs of the South China Sea. This study situates the relocation of Houqua’s family to Canton in the context of the geopolitical situation that led to the emergence of the international port of Canton.

Entrepreneurs must establish themselves within the existing institutional frameworks and develop a sufficient power base before altering the rules of the game to their advantage. Chapter 2 examines the important business institutions for Sino-Western trade in early-19th-century Canton and the business strategy that Houqua employed to establish a presence in the China trade to consolidate his power and, eventually, to outsmart the overpowering British merchants. The waves of international trade in Canton were accompanied by the commercial impact of the reshuffled political powers in Europe. Just as Houqua was achieving prominence in commercial circles in Canton, the French wars, in conjunction with the British Commutation Act, which discouraged smuggling from continental Europe by drastically reducing customs and excise duties on tea in Britain, disrupted China’s trade with continental Europe and allowed Britain to garner the lion’s share of the trade in Canton. Keenly aware of the ascendancy of Britain, Houqua moved to consolidate his share in the business of the EIC. Although trade with the EIC provided a solid bedrock for his business, Houqua still had to counteract hegemonic British interests in Canton. Houqua accomplished this feat by redefining the terms of his business. Expanding beyond his role as a supplier of Chinese goods, he maneuvered into a pivotal position by becoming a critical source of funds for the British, thereby restructuring the division of the economic gains from trade and capturing an increasing share of the profits.

Patterns of global exchange are not static, and participants in the exchange actively transform these patterns to their own benefit. Chapter 3 examines how Houqua transformed his trading network and charted new courses from his home base in Canton. As he explored trading with the newly arriving Americans, Houqua faced a different set of challenges in his international dealings. He confronted these challenges with a pragmatic approach to business. Houqua redirected the flow of his goods and capital and positioned his business for the emerging U.S. market. By allying with his trusted American partners, Houqua not only entered U.S. markets but also tapped into investment opportunities in the financial centers that were burgeoning along the British sinews of capitalistic exchange. At a time when Westerners were still struggling to extend beyond their foothold in Canton into the interior of China, Houqua, by directing traffic from Canton, had already managed to access many overseas markets. Such a formidable accomplishment required that Houqua surmount significant legal and linguistic hurdles and, more importantly, assess and balance his risk exposure in the expanded time and space that his business encompassed.

To fashion new patterns of exchange and to extend trading networks require that enterprising traders cultivate trust and credit with their partners. Houqua’s strategy in developing mutual trust with his partners is the crux of the discussion in Chapter 4. Houqua’s success depended on his ability to maintain an intricate business balance on a global scale.
In addition to carefully positioning his capital and goods around the world, he also secured a network of trust with his international allies. He sustained this network through the continuing physical presence of his closest partners in Canton, the exchange of token gifts with associates abroad, as well as the distribution of his portraits along the sinews of his business empire. Underlying the long-standing relationship in Houqua & Co. was the shared pursuit of profits. This impressive international network not only allowed Houqua to access many trading centers in the West but also enabled him to protect his assets for the next generations and to safeguard his capital during the ensuing politically tumultuous periods.

Managing Houqua’s elaborate business design required the sagacity of a dynamic entrepreneur. Development of the business subsequent to Houqua’s demise in 1843 resulted as much from the ever-shifting geopolitical landscape as from the capabilities of the family members who inherited Houqua’s estate. Chapter 5 studies the reconfiguring of the world of business in the aftermath of the Opium War and the attempt by Houqua’s son to reorganize the family enterprise, even as the various components of his elaborate design were falling apart. Compared to his father who was ever eager to capture additional profits by regulating the currents of commercial traffic, Houqua’s son was more interested in shoring up the status of Canton than in partaking in a recharting of the family’s business flows worldwide. This heightened interest of Houqua’s family in local development highlights the centripetal forces of the Sino-centric culture, which ultimately led to the recoiling of the family from the global reach that Houqua had attained.

Withdrawal from active participation in business does not precipitate an immediate dissipation of assets. Despite his descendants’ retreat from international trade, the immense capital that Houqua had amassed continued to generate profits for his descendants, albeit through investments that also served the business needs of the American partners.
Chapter 6 highlights the pioneering transnational investments of a portion of Houqua’s estate. The most important element of Houqua’s legacy was his decision to entrust his American partners with long-term overseas investments, a decision that reflects the unique challenges facing a business based not on the productivity of physical assets but also on the profitable deployment of liquid assets predicated on the flow of information. Contrary to our conventional emphasis on Chinese wealth accumulation through investments in physical assets and the weakness of the Chinese capital market, Houqua’s strategy forces us to rethink how his farsighted risk management program and entrepreneurial instincts enabled him to overcome the political barriers to doing business in late imperial China and to leverage the boundaries to structure his investment approach.

In addition to his investments in land and properties, the most significant assets that Houqua bequeathed to his descendants were his investments in capital markets that he had entrusted to his handpicked American partner. Decades after Houqua’s death, this partner continued to remit funds to Houqua’s family due to a desire to honor his personal ties to Houqua rather than due to any institutional obligations. From the perspective of the deployment of capital, his American partner became the true inheritor of Houqua’s business from which Houqua’s family continued to profit. Over time, Houqua’s family became merely the financial beneficiaries of his estate as his American partners leveraged Houqua’s capital for investments well beyond the confines of China. Rather than viewing this subsequent period as a usurpation of Houqua’s business enterprise, I regard this development as evidence of Houqua’s foresight in separating management from ownership of assets to take advantage of information flows, a critical factor in the business of trade and finance. As the second half of the 19th century unfolded, Houqua’s plan proved to be effective. The sustained success of Houqua & Co. in navigating international trade transcended national boundaries and defied the simple binaries of the West and the Rest.

This study of Houqua’s business sheds light on the dynamics of global exchange configured around 19th-century Canton as it explores the structural context within which Houqua operated, his strategy to establish his business and to transform the institutions of trade, his efforts to expand his trade network and to cultivate trust among his partners, as well as the lasting legacy of his heir’s reorganization of the family enterprise and the enduring impact of Houqua’s innovative transnational investments. This pattern of interconnections, like any other pattern of global interconnections, assumed a unique configuration that involved both regional and global economies. Houqua, as well as his China trade partners, worked within this configuration and forged new ties to transform it as they negotiated the structural and institutional frameworks for their own benefit. In their search for profits, they fueled the development of linkages around the world in a manner that was distinctive to the times.

Records of the accomplishments of Houqua and his partners in driving the commercial vitality of and the global interactions in old Canton faded only because we have allowed our image of this former emporium to be clouded by China’s weaknesses beginning in the mid-1800s. The subsequent period of exchange underwritten by the rules of international exchange that the Western powers imposed on operators worldwide hardly lasted a century, thus barely matching the longevity of the Canton system. Houqua’s story reshapes our understanding of China’s economic experience in a global context. The success of Houqua & Co. in configuring its networks in the fluid context of the early 19th century remains instructive for us today as the contemporary balance of political power renders the imposition of a West-centric world system increasingly problematic and requires that international traders adapt dynamically to a new world order in which China, once again, occupies center stage.

最近看到一支 YT 影片，影片內容：某綠色宗教組織信徒說，在1661年大肚王就已經率領「全臺灣」的原住民反抗鄭成功。

真的是這樣嗎？1661 年 8 月，荷屬東印度公司派遣一支為數十二艘的艦隊來援，來到臺灣已經 9月，結果遇到颱風來襲，只得緊急出港躲避風浪，其中一艘撞上原住民領地的沙洲擱淺，當地原住民除了捕殺船上的荷蘭人還割下人頭慶祝，最後只留下幾個活口送到普羅民遮 (約今日赤崁樓一帶) 交給鄭軍審問處置。（決戰熱蘭遮P247）

這件事我後來在網路上有看到一個綠色側翼網紅在講，但劇情已經被改編成船上的荷蘭人「全都」被鄭軍給抓了，原住民的角色居然不見了，捕殺荷蘭人割人頭慶祝再送交剩餘活口給鄭軍審問的情節也沒有了。

很神奇吧？歡迎來到充滿綠色日本台灣價值的平行宇宙，在這個宇宙裡，日屬台灣國的高砂原住民都不會互相出草，只會團結一致對付中國來的鄭成功，然後跟著綠色宗教組織懷念日本先進文明的統治。

1661年「全臺灣」的原住民反抗鄭成功？？？還是大肚王率領的？

早在鄭成功還沒有攻臺之前，臺灣就已經有傳聞鄭成功即將攻臺，而荷蘭牧師韓布魯克也有記錄，被他們強迫改信一神教的西拉雅原住民不知為何突然有了底氣，對他的態度變得異常兇悍不客氣。

荷蘭人禁止原住民獵人頭，但是韓布魯克負責傳教的麻豆社原住民 4月27日卻突然發起一場獵人頭行動，還帶回三顆人頭進行「異教」儀式慶祝，當他表示反對這種異教儀式時，卻被凶狠反嗆，這讓他感到相當不安，以至於他懷疑鄭軍早已暗中派人跟原住民串聯反荷。

根據文獻記錄，鄭成功登臺後，就親自走訪許多原住民部落，他們立刻倒向鄭成功陣營加入反荷（決戰熱蘭遮 P196）。

荷蘭牧師所變造的馬太福音羅馬拼音字符版本，將耶和華 Jehovah一辭改成 Ali（阿立祖），讓臺灣原住民族以為他們信仰的阿立祖真的有在海外生一個人間獨生子在傳播基督教教義，藉此誘騙臺灣原住民族改信基督教，原住民被基督教殖民者脅迫改信一神教、禁用南島語命名改西洋式命名，早就積怨甚深，而上述來自基督教殖民者的脅迫，都在鄭成功趕走荷蘭人之後得以解除。

至於所謂的屠殺原住民搶土地這種說法，前面早已提過，鄭成功一開始就有下令屯田部隊尋找土地開墾時不準混侵百姓（明朝移民）以及土民（原住民社）的「現耕物業」。

反倒是荷蘭基督教殖民者透過優勢火器攻打各原民社，使用屠殺手段脅迫他們交出土地歸順後開始納稅，以及改信一神教征服教義消滅原住民族原有的多神祖靈信仰。

但是各位都看不到綠色宗教組織說出這些歷史真相，因為要是被臺灣人知道他們的荷蘭洋教友以前都對臺灣原住民族幹了哪些好事，那麼要想再誇大鄭成功有多可惡，那個難度就很高了。

宗教方面，對於如何消滅臺灣原住民族的信仰文化，1627 年首位來臺傳教的甘治士牧師回報荷蘭東印度公司表示：FORMOSA 原住民沒有文字，所有的歷史記憶和身份認同都是源自他們口述傳承的神話，若能改變這一點，他們和上一代的價值觀就會產生斷層而改變，這對於公司的利益是有幫助的。

為了消滅原住民族口耳相傳的神話傳承，他們還有一條迫害異教徒的教義：行邪術的女人不能容她存活。

很多民族的信仰文化都有女性出任巫祝的角色，為了除掉臺灣原住民部落的「邪惡女巫」（荷蘭牧師韓布魯克對臺灣原住民族尪姨的形容詞），荷蘭基督教殖民者集中流放約 250名尪姨到諸羅山，導致她們在野外大量死亡只剩下不到 50人存活，藉此消滅原住民族口耳相傳的多神信仰傳承以便傳播一神教，結果還被綠色宗教組織吹捧說這是臺灣原住民「受教化」開始「領受主的恩典」，真的是有夠雙標。

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那麼在經過連續兩次的大肚社屠殺屯田軍民事件之後，鄭成功到底有沒有派兵出征大肚社？

根據德國人梅氏日記的記載，1661年 12月，因為鄭成功對熱蘭遮城一直沒有動作只是圍著，卻又下令部隊積極備戰，所以部下將領紛紛猜測，攻打熱蘭遮城是明年的事，備戰可能是年底前會出征那個大肚王。注意，是那個對陳澤部隊假意友善，卻趁機誘殺陳澤軍眷兩千多人的那個大肚王，在發動第二次攻擊累計屠殺五千多鄭軍屯田軍民之後，都大半年過去了，他還一直活的好好的。（決戰熱蘭遮P323）

據梅氏這段供詞來看，很顯然鄭成功並沒有對大肚社進行報復，結果一直備戰的鄭成功，直到 1662 年 1月25日突然對熱蘭遮城發動總攻擊，1月27日荷蘭總督揆一派人出城宣告投降，二月荷蘭人撤僑離台。

緊接著 1662 年 4月，西班牙人又在菲律賓對華人進行種族屠殺，鄭成功一怒之下命令部隊準備出征攻打菲律賓的西班牙人，結果 1662 年 6月23日鄭成功去世。

最後就是各位在網路上經常看到的，後世的鄭經與部下任何有關係到原住民糾紛的事，都被綠色宗教組織巧妙的冠名影射，就說這是「鄭成功的部將」如何如何，藉由「部將」二字讓不知情的人覺得這是鄭成功「派出去的」，想方設法要把所有事情都牽扯到已經辭世很久的鄭成功身上，比如沙轆社事件。

綠色宗教組織醜化鄭成功的慣用手法就是先繪聲繪影的說鄭成功如何殺害原住民搶他們的土地有多可惡，什麼XX事件講的有模有樣好像他人就在現場有全程目擊，但是都不需要引述任何史料文獻來源出處，直到最後實在扯不下去才舉個「實例」來「佐證」，那就是沙轆社事件，可沙轆社事件距離鄭成功死去已經是 8年以後關他屁事？

而記述沙轆社事件傳聞的清朝官員黃叔璥為了政治正確在說謊，從數百人殺到只剩 6人？

依荷蘭公司傳教士所作原民社人口記錄，1656 年之前沙轆社人口也才 108~119 人之間浮動（註：洪麗完～沙轆社與岸裡大社的研究 p.150），而且各原民社人口普遍落在這個數字範圍居多，沙轆社什麼時候突然變成大肚部落聯盟裡人口最多「為最盛」了？還數百人？

就算該原民社真有數百人是整個大肚部落聯盟之中「為最盛」，若果真殺到只剩 6人，又如何能在 50年間，僅憑 6人就能生養恢復成 50多年前傳教士所記錄的百餘人這麼恰巧又這麼剛剛好的數字？

我並不是說沙轆社事件子虛烏有，而是消失的人口數明顯被清朝官員黃叔璥基於政治正確刻意誇大，而這個清朝官員訛傳的假數據，對於綠色宗教組織來說還真不是普通的好用，甚至還被綠色網軍拿去竹篙湊菜刀，說鄭成功把「大肚王國」殺到只剩下 6個人亡國，還吹噓這是「暴風式滅族」。

實際上大肚部落聯盟瓦解是在清朝的事，而且那大肚部落聯盟也不是什麼王國，洋人雖然稱大肚社的首領甘仔轄為「KING」，但是並沒有承認這種複數部落的聯盟是一個「KINGDOM」，所謂的「王國」一說，只不過是綠色宗教組織為了主張中華民國是「外來政權」，刻意誇大臺灣早已有「本土政權」而硬搞出來的東西。

綠色宗教組織總是一副很捨不得臺灣原住民族受委屈的模樣，但是對於他們的荷蘭洋教友屠殺殖民剝削臺灣原住民族的所作所為卻悶不吭聲，這個是什麼？這個叫做吃自助餐，專挑自己想吃的菜。

此外，在更早之前有屯田漢人被殺為什麼不說？
依據臺灣通史記載，1668 年屯田漢人林圯一眾在今日南投處遭到殺害。

『林圯，福建同安人，為延平郡王部將，歷戰有功，至參軍，從入台。
及經之時，布屯田制，圯率所部赴斗六門開墾。其地為土番遊獵，土沃泉甘，形勢險要。
圯至，築柵以居，日與番戰，拓地至水沙連。久之番來襲，力戰不勝，終被圍，食漸盡。
眾議出，圯不可，誓曰：「此吾與公等所困苦而得之土也，寧死不棄。」眾從之。
又數日，食盡，被殺，所部死者數十人。番去，居民合葬之，以時祭祀，名其地為林圯埔。』

1670 年，劉國軒至半線屯田又被襲擊，與孤立無援的林圯不同，掌有兵權的劉國軒直接調動兵馬對沙轆社採取軍事報復行動。

除此之外，早在鄭成功還沒有被大肚社接連兩次屠殺近五千軍民之前，就已經有漢人移民被原住民屠殺 2600 人之多。

為什麼能有 2600 這個精準的數字，這事是這樣，荷蘭基督教殖民者無良剝削漢人農民引發反抗，他們處理漢人農民郭懷一反抗統治的方式，就是叫臣服他們的原住民去殺，還懸賞一顆漢人人頭可以換一匹布，這些只會種地的漢人農民又怎麼會是原住民的對手，那慘況自然可想而知，遭原住民拿人頭換走的布就有 2600 匹之多，而很多人頭其實是沿路追擊潰逃農民途中，為了冒功領賞而在漢人村落濫殺無辜漢人得來的。

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接著我們再來看看，為了醜化鄭成功，綠色宗教組織還能離譜誇張到什麼程度。

據熱蘭遮日誌 1661年 5月24日所載，下午五點半韓布魯克等 2人與一個中國官員攜帶鄭成功寫給荷蘭長官揆一的勸降書進入熱蘭遮城。

在「決戰熱蘭遮」一書裡面，據耶魯大學歷史學博士 Tonio Andrade 考究一份源自士兵 Albrecht Herport 所著的歐洲文獻如此描述：在熱蘭遮城內的傳教士韓布魯克自願將揆一拒絕受降的信件送到鄭成功手上，他兩個女兒（都已嫁人）哭求他別去，韓布魯克則表示，他還有「三個妻女」在城外，如果不回去她們會被殺掉，於是兩個女兒只能心碎看著父親離去。

結果韓布魯克拿著揆一拒絕投降的信出來之後，綁在城門口的馬不知道跑哪去不見了，於是他只好一路走回去普羅民遮（約今日赤崁城一帶），然後什麼事情也沒有發生。

接著重點來了：

1. 這段發生在熱蘭遮城內的場景描述，被一個荷蘭醫生腦補改編成小說，場景延伸拉到鄭軍陣營裡面，說韓布魯克因為勸降不成，與其他勸降的人一回到敵營，就立刻遭到鄭成功遷怒斬首。
2. 另一本荷蘭小說又以這段改編小說為基礎，再加上一個新橋段，讓韓布魯克以民族英雄的姿態登場，在離開前還對熱蘭遮城內困守的同胞發表慷慨激昂的演說，期許揆一跟其他荷蘭人要誓死奮戰到底有的沒的，然後就勇敢的走回敵營從容就義。
3. 最後這部小說的橋段又再次被改編成一齣荷蘭戲劇「福爾摩沙圍城記」，劇中韓布魯克的女兒在熱蘭遮城牆上遠遠看著老父親被鄭成功下令砍頭，那滾在沙地上的頭顱，嘴唇依然動著，彷彿在訴說安慰的話語，於是悲傷過度的她，就從城牆上一躍而下死翹翹。（這視力也未免太好，居然可以從臺南的安平古堡看到赤崁樓那裡去。）

但實際上，前面所提到那些灑狗血劇情，完全都沒有發生，而這個荷蘭版灑狗血劇情還沒完，在臺灣又被改編成綠色宗教組織加強版，劇情變成鄭成功因為不滿荷蘭俘虜勸降不成也就算了，竟然還「交代」信基督教的臺灣原住民要團結反抗他，於是一氣之下就把男俘虜（五個牧師）全部殺頭，加強版還明確列出受刑者名單，分別是：「甘比宇」、「安信紐」、「范堡」（漢布魯克的另一閩南語音譯名）、牟士、溫世繆。

像這種話術，一看就很明顯，這是要操弄他們教會裡面的原住民信徒仇恨鄭成功，但其實當初被迫改信一神教的原住民族很多是協助鄭軍反荷的。

那麼根據荷蘭海外宣教史料類纂所載，「甘比宇」傳教士早在 1655年就已病死，1656年來接替他的「安信紐」傳教士也在 1657年就已死去，而這時候的鄭成功根本還沒穿越時空打過來。

至於牟士、溫世繆，他們後來是死在一場報復艦隊轟炸的處刑，這件事後面會說到。換言之，五個牧師都在 1661年 5月因為勸降不成就被鄭成功遷怒斬首的說法，根本都是穿越時空。

再來是凌虐荷蘭基督教俘虜逼他們改信媽祖，這種充滿綠色日本台灣價值的劇情更好笑，鄭成功的父親鄭芝龍是天主教信徒，鄭成功跟一個義大利籍的天主教神父李科羅交情很好，李科羅常在鄭軍內部到處傳教拉信徒，鄭成功會吃飽撐著強逼荷蘭俘虜改信媽祖？

鄭軍所部軍民信仰北極玄天上帝者眾，而後來的陳永華在全臺所建 39座宮廟也根本沒有一間是媽祖廟，臺灣的媽祖信仰，是清朝時期才開始被推廣起來的。

據說鄭成功的降清叛將施琅在攻下澎湖後居功自傲引來皇帝注意，於是趕緊向皇帝上奏說這都要歸功天妃林默娘保佑海象平穩他才能出征順利，意思說他沒有很厲害只是搭神明便車沾光而已，於是康熙皇帝就冊封天妃林默娘升格為天后。

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接著再來看另一則醜化鄭成功的話術，綠色宗教組織的謊言創意不斷，只有你腦子想不到的，沒有什麼他們不敢說出口的，反正事後只要向他們的主耶穌基督懺悔就能得赦免。

荷蘭人帶了不少非洲黑人奴隸來到臺灣，臺南有個地方名烏鬼橋，據傳就是荷蘭人在此奴役黑人建造的橋，臺灣人以此典故用閩南話做為地名。

熱蘭遮圍城期間，在普羅民遮（約今日赤崁樓一帶）被俘的黑人奴隸都直接投靠鄭軍，理由再簡單不過了，當然就是要脫離基督教奴隸主的奴役，而鄭成功這個大氣的新老闆還把擊敗荷蘭將軍拔鬼仔所繳獲的火槍直接撥發給他們使用，成立一支火槍隊，絕對信任，放心的直接武裝他們。

2024年 4月28日臺南鄭成功祖廟中樞春祭，荷蘭總督揆一的後代應邀來臺南參與這場盛事，有媒體報導說他感謝鄭成功接受揆一的投降以及不殺之恩，就有人硬是要跳出來說揆一並沒有投降而是跟鄭成功議和。

這些人的邏輯真是讓人大開眼界，你都不願意投降了，人家還幹嘛跟你談條件起草和約內容？

實際上鄭軍在 1月25日砲轟打下烏特勒支堡，從此可以架炮居高臨下隨時砲轟熱蘭遮城內部，揆一知道這熱蘭遮城牆已經沒有任何掩蔽作用了，繼續躲在城堡裡面反而會被炮彈打到更危險，於是只好在 1月27日派人通知鄭軍說願意投降，接著雙方開始談議和的簽約內容。

揆一當初已經拒絕鄭成功的勸降，所以鄭成功其實是可以不用受降的，但已經佔了上風的鄭成功還是接受了揆一的投降，並且讓所有荷蘭人拿著財物離開。

而揆一在簽約之後才想起要帶走他們抓來的黑人奴隸，對他們來講這也是私有財產，遭到鄭成功直接拒絕，這件事居然被綠色宗教組織利用話術造謠說：「雖然鄭成功同意讓荷蘭人離開臺灣，但仍然有很多人並沒有被放走，而是被留在臺灣當奴隸」。

我看到這種綠色網軍貼文時一整個傻眼，只好又重新編輯本文補充這節，實情是這些黑人奴隸在鄭軍控制普羅民遮時，就已經脫離奴隸的身份，而且還配發繳獲自荷將拔鬼仔部隊的荷蘭火槍成為火槍兵，早就槍口轉過來對著曾經奴役他們的基督教奴隸主，若是任由他們被帶走豈不是要害他們慘遭凌虐報復？

至於有些灣生的荷印混血二代，因為對於未曾謀面的「祖國」荷蘭並沒有印象與感情，所以選擇繼續留在臺灣過生活。

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接著我們再來揭穿鄭成功強娶荷蘭牧師韓布魯克女兒為妾的綠色謊言，為了醜化鄭成功，綠色宗教組織還在那邊什麼荷蘭金絲貓有的沒的一直亂講。

1661年10月，早已投靠鄭軍陣營的黑人男孩，決定替鄭軍探查敵方機密，志願回去熱蘭遮城作間諜，為了詐降取信於荷蘭人，除了說出鄭軍陣營許多內部現況跟壞話，其中一個黑人男孩指稱鄭成功強娶了韓布魯克的一個女兒為妾，還把韓布魯克殺了。（決戰熱蘭遮 P266）

然而他們兩人在熱蘭遮城的刺探行為最終被識破而遭到逮捕刑求，因此先前透露的鄭軍內部現況被歸類為「虛假證詞」。（注意，對綠色宗教組織來說，荷蘭人認定的虛假證詞，基於政治正確，那就必須是真的。）
面對刑求，這兩個黑人男孩為了求生存，他們堅稱是為了恢復信基督教，才特地脫離中國異教徒的控制跑回熱蘭遮城。（決戰熱蘭遮 P267）

最後有關韓布魯克的消息，是熱蘭遮城日誌 1661年 10月24日，荷蘭人審訊 10月21日抓到的 10個黑人男孩，黑人男孩指稱，聽說韓布魯克已經在新港社被斬首，但是具體時間跟原因則說不清楚。

當時的荷蘭俘虜中，有家庭的會集中扣留在普羅民遮區看管、沒讓他們親人離散，至於單身的公司職員（傳教士也算職員）或是僱庸兵則是另外集中在新港社看管。

而前面提到，荷蘭公司曾經在 1661年 8月派出一支為數 12艘的艦隊來救援，到臺灣已經 9月，有一艘還因躲避颱風導致擱淺，被當地原住民登艦捕殺後只留幾個活口送交鄭軍審問。

不料這個艦隊司令官搞不清楚狀況，他似乎「忘記」自己公司還有俘虜在人家手上，直接下令艦隊朝普羅民遮的鄭軍居住所猛烈砲轟，造成鄭軍部隊連同家眷傷亡，那混居看管的荷蘭俘虜也不知有多少是遭到自己人的艦砲轟死。

作為報復，於是鄭成功就下令把傳教士處死，因為鄭成功覺得我跟揆一還在對峙等開門談判的狀態，結果你這傢伙一來就是直接開殺，那就是不用談了是吧？你連自己人的死活都不管了，既然這樣那就沒有什麼好說的，要殺都來殺。

結果這個艦隊司令官發現闖下大禍害到自己人，留下幾艘戰艦在海面待命，自己則是隨便找個理由就這麼跑掉了，這波操作搞得被困在熱蘭遮城裡面等待救援的揆一也是懵了。

至於綠色宗教組織精心改編劇情用來哄騙他們教會信徒仇鄭專用的傳教士韓布魯克，按照前面熱蘭遮城日誌所載的黑人男孩供詞，他應該就是死在這次新港社的處刑。

有一本荷蘭人著作的歷史小說「福爾摩沙之王」，這是作者以家傳歷史文件為基礎的寫作，他說他當初那個來臺灣傳教的先人（直系祖先的兄弟），就是死在這場報復艦隊轟炸普羅民遮鄭軍居住所的處刑。

各位要知道，古代對於不可能接收的男性俘虜通常會直接殺掉，因為把他們放回去一拿起武器又得再跟他們打一次，而關押著又得消耗糧食養活他們，一般都是直接處死。所以鄭成功在部隊嚴重缺糧的狀態下，依然留著這些荷蘭俘虜跟揆一耗著，也沒有搞什麼每天在城外砍幾個砍到揆一願意出來投降為止的把戲，可以說鄭成功已經是很客氣了。

雖然是敵人，但鄭成功仍然依照傳統民俗觀念，於新港社設宴，讓即將上路的傳教士飽餐一頓不用當餓死鬼，在吃完最後一餐之後開始行刑，結果這個橋段也被綠色宗教組織信徒不講前因只講後果，然後語焉不詳的說傳教士韓布魯克是死在一場屠殺，說鄭成功以宴會之名把他們這些俘虜找過來然後就全部殺了，這簡直是什麼跟什麼，這場宴會本來就是行刑前要給他們吃的最後一餐，什麼叫做以宴會之名把他們找來。

綠色宗教組織吹噓傳教士是來「教化」臺灣原住民族讓他們得以領受主的恩典，還吹噓牧師們是因為勸降不成又特別交代臺灣的原住民要團結反抗鄭成功，這才被遷怒斬首，但其實並不是，他們更不會告訴你，這些傳教士倚靠士兵的威壓體罰不願意改信一神教的原住民。當然，也是有個別秉性良善的傳教士反對公司裡面的牧師這麼做，只是這樣善良的極少數，在那個混亂的大時代也因為這次艦隊轟炸事件遭殃，這種事也的確是有，我們要有一說一。

那麼有別於其他公司俘虜，德國人梅氏因為來臺時間久閩南話說的很好，所以就被鄭成功留在身邊陪聊天以及幫他繪測土地，他的特殊待遇被荷蘭公司視為通敵叛徒而加以審訊，所謂的梅氏「日記」其實就是被審訊的回憶錄。

依德國人梅氏日記裡面的供詞，並未提到鄭成功有強娶荷蘭牧師未成年之女為妾一事，而且根據熱蘭遮城日誌所載，1662年 2月6日，韓布魯克「在城外的妻女三人」回到熱蘭遮城，最後離開臺灣。

簡單講，韓布魯克的未成年幼女被鄭成功強娶為妾一事根本子虛烏有，是綠色宗教組織為了詆毀鄭成功而特意訛傳的操作手法。

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有看到一個綠色宗教組織的信徒惡意留言放話說鄭成功屠殺幾十萬原住民，我一直問他這數據哪裡來的，他只會無腦重複跳針叫我自己去查，但是依日本學者中村孝志的研究，1647年荷蘭人統計全臺控制範圍內的原住民也才 62,849人，到了 1656年的統計居然只剩 31,181人，近 9年竟然減少一半人口。

村落數則是從 246變成 162，足足少了 84個，顯見這種動輒將整個村落一次性滅絕的作法已經是常態，我們甚至可以說，在基督教殖民者一開始來臺的前 23年，就不知道已經滅絕多少反抗村落，最終才剩下這 246座不敢還手，讓傳教士得以進去打橫著走做調查記錄的原住民村落。

搞了半天，原來所謂「燒殺擄掠、侵奪土地、強迫殖民的台版哥倫布」，根本不是專業背黑鍋的鄭成功，而是綠色宗教組織的荷蘭洋教友，諷刺的是，被嚴重醜化的鄭成功反而是讓原住民免於遭受一神教繼續迫害的人。

最後為了符合綠色日本台灣價值，這全臺灣原住民族遭洋教友滅絕消失過半的黑鍋，還是得讓綠色宗教組織最愛的專業背鍋戶鄭成功來扛，不但要讓鄭成功扛，而且還要把消失的人口數再乘個 10倍變成幾十萬讓他扛個夠，畢竟我們的洋牧師那可都是因信稱義的聖徒，在中世紀的繪畫那頭上都是有光環的，都是來教化原住民領受主的恩典，都是上帝的使徒，你這個邪惡異教徒鄭成功竟然敢動他們，這還不把你在鬥垮之前先鬥臭？

那麼前面有提到，約 250名尪姨被集中流放造成大量死亡，各位有沒有發現，這個數字與 246個村莊數大致相當，每個村莊負責傳承原住民祖靈信仰文化的尪姨，都被韓布魯克這種傳教士指稱為邪惡女巫，然後向公司長官獻計後給抓去集中流放了，結果臺灣還搞了一齣大內宣歌仔戲，裡面有個橋段是荷蘭傳教士跟原住民尪姨和樂融融在一起唱歌。

實情是強制流放所有尪姨後，荷蘭公司開始脅迫臺灣原住民族改信一神教，不少傳教士以體罰欺壓等手段管理傳教區域的原住民，你願意受洗來教堂做禮拜那我們就是同一個天父的兄弟姊妹，你要是不肯受洗信教那就不是自己人而是異教徒，而一神教的教義是允許滅絕異教徒的（申命記13：12～15）。

我在查找相關資料時發現，直到今天，綠色宗教組織信徒甚至說那些不願意受洗的臺灣原住民就是拜魔鬼的異教徒，嗯？別人拜祖靈就是在拜魔鬼，那你們這些人拜的耶和華就是唯一真神？

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最後再送給各位一個彩蛋，被綠色宗教組織冠名為「台灣這塊土地主人」的原住民族，已經被證實是至少約五千年前就從福建一帶入住臺灣的亞洲人種，也就是他們口中：「從中國來的中國人」。

我故意在深綠粉專的貼文底下留言踢爆這件事以後，綠色網軍們就開始坐不住了，個個突然搖身一變成了人類學者跟血液遺傳學專家，開始製造臺灣原住民族的人種起源來歷，各種說法五花八門，從哪裡來都行就是不能從中國來。

目前看過最扯的一篇為臺灣是地球人種的起源地，還把臺灣原住民族的遷徙路線逆推，說臺灣原住民進入福建後沿著海岸北上最後往西進入河南形成殷商文化，說臺灣原住民才是中國人的祖先，該貼文現在的累積按讚數已經不知幾千，你們看這股綠色信仰之力有多可怕，當政治意識型態凌駕科考研究之上時，人就會開始失去理智。

臺灣的原住民族是從山東沿著海岸線一路南下進入到福廣甚至越南一帶的亞洲人種，殷商時期大陸東南沿海的「南夷」、「山越」，乃至於春秋戰國時代的沿海小國吳越相爭，史書記載他們「斷髮紋身」「習水好戰」「以船代步」，這些大陸東南沿海地區的古人其實都是臺灣「原始南島語族」在對岸的同宗，搞不好那個沉魚落雁的西施開口笑的時候還少了一顆牙（考古證據顯示兩岸原住民族遺骨都有鑿牙的習俗），至於為什麼亞洲人種到了臺灣會有南洋人種外觀，這又是另外一段故事了。

有關臺灣原住民族人種起源的詳細考證內容，請點擊閱讀。

明朝的國姓爺鄭成功，臺灣歷來的執政者都在攀附他的光芒，為了拉攏漢人，康熙說「朱成功明室遺臣，非吾之亂臣賊子。」光緒還準沈葆禎所奏，在臺灣為他立祠。

日本殖民政權還把臺南的小廟改建成大型神社，透過他的日本母親沾一下光，說他是第一個統治臺灣的日本人。國民黨執政時把臺南的地方祭祀列入中樞祭祀，希望他的反清復明能被國人仿效，以圖反攻大陸之用。

就因為不希望臺灣人崇拜鄭成功想要反攻統一，他就無端受累遭到綠色宗教組織眼紅，一再宣稱鄭成功屠殺原住民搶他們的土地很可惡，先射箭再畫靶，務必將他在鬥垮之前先鬥臭。

鄭成功最常被拿來指稱屠殺原住民的爭議就是大肚社事件，還製作成節目上了電視播放，但是我在查找相關資料時才發現，這件事居然還有一個超冷門罕見版本，大肚社事件其實有兩次。

一份 1570年大航海時代的西班牙文獻指出，在彰化已經發現有漢人居住，而比起 1570年又更早的史料文獻則是戚繼光所著，他在 1563年的明史「雞籠山條」之「破海寇事云」提到，明軍掃除為患臺海兩岸原漢民族的倭寇之後，有中國漁船從臺灣的魍港來到福建，兩岸恢復往來通販。而此後過了約 60年荷蘭人才來到臺灣殖民，顯見自古以來從大陸東南沿海移民入住臺灣的時間不知已有多久。

綠色宗教組織為了讓臺灣人相信臺灣自古與中國沒有任何關聯，除了訛稱中國是中華民國的簡稱，說中國只有113年歷史，又說臺灣原住民族出現在有文字的記載是在荷蘭 1624年，並且宣稱從荷蘭人來到臺灣開始才是「開台」，還鬼扯說臺灣的漢人都是鄭芝龍載運過來給荷蘭人種殖民作物才開始有，但文獻顯示至少 461年前臺灣就已經有漢人開墾居住。

至於所謂的中國一詞，不止戚繼光，明太祖朱元璋的北伐檄文早就以中國自稱明朝，而鄭成功則是明朝冊封的王爺，王爺是可以有自己封地的，所以從鄭成功與荷蘭人簽約生效拿回臺灣開始，臺灣就已經算是明朝的版圖，那些還在叫囂什麼時候算「自古」的綠色網軍，可以去問他們的荷蘭洋教友 1662年算不算古代。

那為什麼自古以來從福建來到臺灣西邊登陸的明朝移民那麼多，往北卻只有分佈到彰化為止？再北上往臺中大肚方向去不行嗎？

還真的不行，因為那可真真是會要人命的。

初時西班牙殖民者據北臺，荷蘭殖民者據南臺，兩者之所以可以相安無事，是因為中間卡了一個過不去的大肚部落聯盟，外來人一靠近那就是：有什麼話先躺下再說。

1642年荷蘭公司走海路北上趕跑西班牙人之後，為了貫通中部陸路交通，於1644年再次走海路北上攻打臺灣北部原住民族使之屈服，接著首次嘗試走陸路南下，以優勢火器猛攻大肚社強行穿越且成功突圍回到大員（今日安平）。

1645年荷蘭公司再次出兵北上攻打大肚社摧毀 13個抗荷部落，最高曾統領 27個部落的大肚王，他的部落聯盟已經半殘即將瓦解，最後由荷蘭隨軍牧師出來作白臉，讓大肚王以族語的羅馬拼音文簽下臣服條約，接受荷蘭人賜與他的權杖並承認他在當地的管理權，而他則同意給予荷蘭人通行權，但不許在大肚社控制區內停留，這是為了防止傳教士在大肚社宣傳外來的一神教教義，因為這是一種毀滅原住民多神信仰的征服教義。

1661年4月底，鄭成功登臺奪熱蘭遮城，於攻城受挫後，決定採取長期包圍態勢，因糧食不繼，令大部隊暫時分散各地屯田，於是發生大肚社的衝突，目前找到兩個版本：

版本一，依熱蘭遮城日誌所述，1661年6月3日(西曆)的前幾天，兩千多個中國人與被抓去當翻譯用的30名荷蘭俘虜來到大肚，中國人試探對方是否願意加入他們，大肚王給了中國人要求的食物，等中國人鬆懈後，再暗地通知荷蘭俘虜準備應變，然後集結聯盟部落突襲中國人的營地殺了一千五百多人，剩下的中國人逃進甘蔗田，大肚王就下令放火燒甘蔗田把中國人逼出後再繼續殺。

基於政治正確，這個版本非常罕見，貼文者甚至宣稱這是荷蘭人被打敗後為了自嗨所偽作。但真的是這樣嗎？荷蘭公司登載文件記錄可是很嚴謹的。

在「決戰熱蘭遮」一書裡面，據耶魯大學歷史學博士 Tonio Andrade 考究的一份歐洲文獻，這是一個士兵 Albrecht Herport 從當時其中一個荷蘭俘虜口中聽來的說法：

鄭軍陳澤的部隊宣毅前鎮北上尋找土地屯田，一開始大肚部落先表示歡迎友好，不但給了中國人缺乏的糧食，還熱情招待酒水，等中國人鬆懈心防入夜酣眠，就召集其他部落的原住民一起趁夜襲殺，一次就殺死約一千五百多人，生還者躲進樹林，就從四面八方放火煙燻出來再繼續殺。(決戰熱蘭遮P217～218)

已經被荷蘭槍炮火器打到害怕而臣服的大肚王，手裡拿著荷蘭人賜給他的權杖，面對食物短缺的陳澤部隊邀約合作趕走荷蘭人，大肚王根本不想押寶在連後勤補給都明顯有問題的鄭軍陣營，但是又不想明著拒絕、怕起衝突打起來，於是他決定先下手為強來陰的。

因為有大肚王假意友善、誘騙屠殺兩千多屯田漢人在先，這日後要是有被報復也不意外，比較不好帶風向說鄭成功屠殺原住民，這個版本就成了綠色宗教組織不敢聲張的秘密。

版本二，清朝的章回小說「臺灣外紀」第11卷：七月 (農曆)，張志、黃明縱管事楊高凌削土番，大肚番阿德狗讓殺高反。成功令楊祖徵之。祖與讓戰，中標鎗死。其鋒甚熾，欲出援荷蘭。功復令黃安、陳瑞二鎮往徵。安設伏誘戰，遂斬阿德狗讓。撫緩餘黨，班師。

這個版本最政治正確，有管事楊高凌削土番引起反抗的劇情超讚，可惡的鄭成功還因此派兵殺了大肚王阿德狗讓。

除了透過電視播放，綠色側翼網軍的引用數最高，怎麼查都看的到，一整個充滿綠色日本台灣價值，可是目前能查到的西方資料裡，當時的大肚王以 Camachat 甘仔轄為姓氏，並沒有一個大肚王的名稱發音聽起來像「阿德狗讓」。

事實上，為了更容易控制統治漢人，乾隆藉口編修四庫全書，對中國人進行思想改造，令天下交出藏書後銷毀改以竄改後的偽版本取代，至於有名的科學工藝製造百科全書「天工開物」，只因書中出現北虜字樣就遭銷毀查禁，以至於中國就此科工技術停滯。

有不願被滿清統治的明遺民東渡日本帶去天工開物一書，經近代旅日華僑發現此一海外孤本攜回，這才知道原來明朝有非常發達的日常科技應用，但是從清朝開始中國的科工發展卻已經遠遠落後西方殖民列強，乾隆也醜化明史，還大搞文字獄殘害他認為懷念明朝的人，而當時有關鄭成功的文字記載，都已經被火焚銷毀後，改用政治正確的醜化版本替代。

現今對他攻台期間的研究，主要以外國文獻如熱蘭遮日誌、梅氏日記⋯等等為主，但所知有限，直到部將戶都事楊英的日記抄本在1927年被發現，後人才得以對鄭成功的生平有更多瞭解。（幸好交出正本前家族有人抄錄副本留存）

版本二清朝章回小說的劇情，對照楊英日記所載，卻是完全顛覆：
五月二日任命左衝鎮黃安管虎衛右鎮。
五月十八日鄭成功下令：「不准混侵土民及百姓現耕物業。」
七月：「援勦後鎮(張志)、後衝鎮(黃昭)官兵激變大肚土番叛，衝殺左先鋒鎮營，楊祖與戰，被傷敗回，至省病，死之。圍援勦後鎮（張志）。右虎衛(黃安)、英兵鎮(陳瑞)、智武鎮(顏望忠)敗回，差兵都事李胤監制各鎮，不准攪擾土社，吊〈(調)〉後衝鎮等移札南社。」

上述日記內容明確指出，張志營、黃昭營與大肚社發生衝突後，大肚社衝殺左先鋒陣營，楊祖出戰被傷後回省養傷，最終不治病亡。

接著張志營被圍，鄰近的黃安營、陳瑞營、顏望忠營前往解圍卻全數敗回，最後由差兵都事李胤監制相關各鎮不准攪擾土社，並且把解圍救人不成的相關各鎮都調去離遠一點的南社駐紮。

至於被圍的張志呢？楊英日記沒提到，依據熱蘭遮城日誌的描述，荷蘭人聽到的消息說他已經被大肚社給殺了，聽說是從三千多人殺到只剩兩百多人。

鄭成功派黃安、陳瑞「設伏誘戰斬殺大肚番阿德狗讓」，再「緩撫餘黨勝利班師」的清朝章回小說情節，根本沒有發生，實際上黃安、陳瑞、顏望忠都是解圍不成反敗回，還被遠遠調去南社了事，並且「監制各鎮不准攪擾土社」。把小說情節拿來當正史講，這也就綠色宗教組織才敢，而且還是非常的敢。

註：請注意這段原文：「右虎衛、英兵鎮、智武鎮敗回」，有綠色網軍雖然也有貼出楊英日記，但是卻故意拿掉這段，讓你不知道黃安、陳瑞、顏望忠其實都解圍不成敗回，刻意誤導你相信黃安、陳瑞跟清朝章回小說寫的一樣不但有出兵，而且還打敗大肚社斬殺阿德狗讓勝利班師，藉此炒作說鄭成功屠殺原住民，但實際上卻是鄭軍又遭大肚社屠殺三千多人。

（繼續閱讀）

On 22 June 1807, HMS Leopard hove to alongside USS Chesapeake with its guns primed and ready, despite being at peace. The British captain demanded he be let aboard the U.S. ship to examine the crew for British deserters. When the Americans refused, the British unleashed their broadsides, forcing the Chesapeake to surrender. British Marines paraded aboard the U.S. ship and hauled away four U.S. citizens to be tried for desertion from British service. They were each sentenced to receive 500 lashes, a de facto death sentence.[1] Although the sentences were remitted, the men languished in British prisons for years, and one died before the rest were repatriated to the United States.

Of his treatment of the Chesapeake, the British captain wrote that he did “most sincerely deplore that any lives should have been lost in the execution of a service, which might have been adjusted more amicably.”[2] The bloodshed was regrettable but necessary to safeguard British rights.

[1] George C. Daughan, 1812: The Navy’s War (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 16-17.

[2] James S. Clarke and John McArthur, eds., The Naval Chronicle: Containing a General and Biographical History of the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom with a Variety of Original Papers on Nautical Subjects: Volume XVIII, July-December 1807 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 340.

《唐十道圖》是《歷代地理指掌圖》所收錄的 44幅自帝嚳至宋代歷代區域沿革地圖中的一幅。

《歷代地理指掌圖》的作者有兩種說法，一說是蘇試，另一說是稅安禮，根據圖中南宋建置和序文判斷，不可能出自蘇軾之手。南宋陳振孫《直齋書錄解題》則認為是 “蜀人稅安禮撰"，如此說屬實，則圖約於北宋元符年間 (1098-1100) 繪成,，南宋淳熙十二年 (1185) 趙亮夫有所增訂，共 44幅圖，每幅圖都有圖名，圖後均附説明，為中國現存最早的一部歷史地圖集。一般所見多為明代刻本，目前僅知日本國立國會圖書館存有一宋刻本。

唐初將全國分劃為十個行政區，《唐十道圖》就是繪出這十個行政區界線的一幅地圖，該圖是中國歷史地圖中第一個標示台灣（流求）的地圖，雖然在圖中只是一個點。根據《新唐書·藝文志》記載，《十道圖》有三種版本，均為多卷本，長安四年十道圖十三卷，開元三年十道圖十卷，及李吉甫十道圖十卷。至於《歷代地理指掌圖》收錄的《唐十道圖》來自那個版本已無法考據了。

隋史記載大業元年（605年）海師何蠻“天清風靜，東望依希似有烟霧之氣，亦不知幾千里”，大業三年派朱寬入海求訪異俗因此去了 “流求”。福建沿海肉眼可看到的絕對不是現在的琉球。且隋史中記載 “流求” 有 “熊羆豺狼，尤多豬雞，無牛羊驢馬” ，而事實上，琉球有產馬，隋史中又說”其處少鐵”，事實上琉球根本不產鐵，而台灣不產馬，牛、羊也是後來（明末）移入的，且有少量的鐵，隋史中的 “流求” 指的是台灣是很明顯的。唐《杜氏通典》中有關“流求”的記載基本上是抄錄了隋史的記載，只是將“流求”改為“琉球”。

參考：淺析《華夷圖》與《古今華夷區域總要圖》之間的關係

王迪安 (2025)《大交流：伍秉鑑的怡和行與十九世紀的全球貿易》(香港大學出版社 Asian Business Histories 亞洲企業史叢書) 實為作者 2016 年博士論文的中譯：

John D Wong, “Global Trade in the Nineteenth Century: The House of Houqua and the Canton System”

Table of Contents

Introduction
1 A Study of the Structural Context: The Colliding Worlds in Canton 18
2 Lodging in an Existing Institution: Taming the Lion at Home 32
3 Weaving a Trading Network: Breaking Free with the Eagle 72
4 Sustaining Trust: Overcoming Business Uncertainties through Time and Space 105
5 To Reorganize or to Be Recognized? Reconstituting Business in the Reconfigured World of Global Business 135
6 Houqua’s “Swiss Account" in America: The Legacy of a Farsighted Entrepreneur 177
Conclusion 205
Epilogue
Bibliography
Index

Houqua in Chinese and Global History (p.6~13)

Through the lens of a single prominent merchant house and its leading figure, this project explores the economic dynamism in early-19th-century Canton. This study of Houqua and the Canton trade system adopts a global perspective. Such a global approach, overlooked by previous generations of scholars, seeks to underscore the commercial vitality and transnational exchange during the era of the Canton trade.⁶ Each generation of earlier scholars of the Canton trade has focused on the decline of the Qing by interpreting historical issues through the lens of scholars of the respective eras. In the early part of the 20th century, when China was struggling to find its footing on the international scene, research began to chronicle the rise and fall of various Hong families, but without capturing the dynamic economic exchanges in which they participated.⁷ Similarly, scholars who wrote before China’s recent economic takeoff have focused on the cases of insolvency among the Hong merchants as their studies reflected on China’s prolonged economic struggles.⁸ Balanced assessments of the Canton system have only begun to appear more recently.⁹ Extending the analysis to the China trade of the 19th century as the impact of geopolitical forces escalated, through the individual stories of Houqua and his partners this study explores the dynamic global networks of commerce in the decades prior to the Opium War. ¹⁰

Known today as Guangzhou, the Chinese city of Canton served as a dynamic node for transnational commerce until the demise of the Canton System in 1842. Tracing the footprint of its trading networks, this study includes archival work in Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Macao, Bei-jing, Taipei, Singapore, Boston, Providence, England, and India. The investigation covers genres of literature ranging from business records, family papers, personal correspondence, gazetteers, genealogies, government documents, travelogues, and anthologies of literary works. These sources are highly complementary. Whereas the Chinese court documents explain the Qing bureaucratic mechanisms of the Canton trade and the British East India Company (EIC) databank chronicles the ascending commercial prowess of England, the American records shed light not only on the business transactions but also on the personal stories of the individual traders. The genealogies of Houqua’s family, in addition to tracing the lineage of the Wu clan, also detail Houqua’s strategy for business succession. As the scattered historical records are reconnected, the emerging picture demonstrates the success of Houqua and his trading partners in sustaining their economic exchange on a global scale long before Western imperialism ushered in the era of international trade in the Euro-centric modern world at the turn of the 20th century.

In the early 19th century, certain economic actors in Qing China, especially those in Canton, had become so involved in the world of commerce and finance that it is impossible to isolate their “Chinese experience" from the development of global processes. Their stories, however, reflect not only the “impact of the West," as these Chinese traders were not passive reactors to Western forces; rather, they were enterprising strategists furthering their economic interests in view of the shifting geopolitical landscape. To appreciate the interactions among the various players in this dynamic, multipolar trading world, one needs to go beyond not only the Fairbank model of the “Western Impact-Chinese Response" but also the later paradigm of “China-centered history,"¹¹ The ever-evolving equilibrium in the 19th-century Canton system pivoted precisely around the traders’ ability to navigate the turbulent waters brought about by the colliding regimes. As a central player in the world of commerce and a crucial figure in the geopolitics of the first half of the 19th century, Houqua offers a unique perspective on global development at the decisive juncture when China’s fortunes began to diverge. His story allows us to explore how the divergence of business development on a macroeconomic scale pivoted around the talents and inclinations of specific individuals. Of course, even the most successful entrepreneur had to function within the geopolitical context of his times, but the fortunes of empires were contingent on the strategies of exceptional individuals in charting their course of business.

This analysis of Houqua’s enterprise intervenes in the major debates that have preoccupied economic historians. Much has been written about the Canton system as a precursor to the Opium War and the subsequent demise of China. These scholarly analyses, usually privileging political and diplomatic developments, highlight the mounting incompatibility of Western and Chinese models of interaction and the reversal of the silver flows to which the Chinese merchants supposedly succumbed.¹² The story of Houqua and the Canton trade makes it clear that the Chinese economy did not merge with the routes of international trade with the advent of the Opium War. By the time of Houqua’s rise to prominence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the merchants in Canton had already weathered half a century of geopolitical turmoil around the globe. ¹³ Through the work of the sophisticated Hong merchants operating under the Canton system, China became integrated into the global economy well before the arrival of the gunboats that altered the terms of transnational engagement. Houqua’s ability to sustain his interactions with global players for decades in the field of commerce defies the conventional assumption of an ossified Chinese system that failed to adjust to international developments and that doomed Chinese participation in the integration of the world. By reviving this story of economic vibrancy, we return to the juncture when the commercial equilibrium fell apart with the collapse of the Canton system. The focus on this moment of historical contingency reshapes our understanding of China’s critical role in the formation of a global network of trade and finance prior to the Opium War.

A better appreciation of how the system unraveled provides a new perspective to examine China’s economic divergence from the West during the subsequent period. Economic historians have debated how the West escaped stagnation whereas China lagged behind, primarily from the perspective of industrial development. ¹⁴ Some studies have linked the issue of economic growth to the role of the Chinese state, but few have constructed a comparative analysis of this early period to explore how different configurations in the alignment of the interests of the state and the business sectors led to economic divergence. In studies of the British experience, early scholarship focused on the role of finance as a facilitating device, but more recent analyses highlight finance and commerce as independent activities that contributed to economic growth independent of domestic industrial expansion. ¹⁵ This realization of the contribution of finance and commerce to the British imperial enterprise redirected scholars’ attention to the social networks of bankers. ¹⁶ It was precisely in the successful redeployment of capital by “gentlemanly capitalists" to generate healthy investment returns that the financial sector earned its prominent position in the economics of the British Empire. Such a revelation of the contribution of finance and services independent of industry should have invited comparisons with the East Asian experiences. But thus far comparative analyses involving East Asia have seldom extended beyond Japan and such comparisons have been limited to assessments of the role of finance in the successful transformation of Japan into an industrial power. ¹⁷

As this study extends its focus on the role of merchants in facilitating China’s exchange with the outside world, it also highlights their relations with the state. Existing scholarship on this topic shows that the court in Qing China, preoccupied with its imperial expansion along its northwestern frontier, adopted a continental posture that promoted property rights more actively in the landbound regions where the state had to open up territories rather than along the maritime frontier of the southeast coast.¹⁸ Zelin and others demonstrate a clear definition of property rights in China and the state’s role in enforcing these rights.¹⁹ However, except in cases in which assurances of no state appropriations served the needs of the Qing state for land reclamations along its expanding land-bound frontier, ²⁰ the state safeguarded property rights among its subjects but not between the state and its subjects. Although the state facilitated the use of contracts in the vibrant markets along the southeastern coast, protection of private wealth from the confiscatory state remained weak. ²¹ The constant pressure from the state and the ill-defined financial obligations to national and local needs engendered among successful traders deep-rooted suspicion of any gains from investing alongside the state. Such misgivings deterred cooperation between the Chinese state and the wealthy merchants in redeploying capital toward economic development in a manner that would have generated financial returns to the investors and that would have remained consistent with the Qing’s imperial agenda. In this respect, the experiences of Houqua and the other Hong merchants contrast sharply with those of Western financiers, such as the Rothschilds.²² This contrast underscores the potent power of financial resources for the political expansion and economic growth of empires, power unleashed most effectively when those with financial capital can maintain a certain level of autonomy from the state. The reluctance of the Hong merchants to redeploy their capital in conjunction with the Ding court’s economic initiatives lends support to institutional theories of economic divergence. ²³

Houqua’s story extends beyond the scope of the existing literature that has predominately highlighted economic activities within China proper, His extensive and complicated global transactions required an elaborate system of trade that defies any simplistic analysis of business organization. Not only did Houqua have to structure his business in China in the idiom of Chinese family relations,²⁴ but he also had to engage his international partners in Canton according to Western conventions and to extend his reach overseas by developing networks of trust.²⁵ This study demonstrates that a large measure of Houqua’s success stemmed from his ability to maintain an intricate balance between his commercial interests and those of his Western counterparts, all during an era of transnationalism before the imposition of a Western world order.

Houqua’s business dealings also shed light on the macroeconomic issue of silver flows. This analysis of the business of individual merchants enhances understanding that has hitherto been confined to macroeconomic investigations of the trade balance and Western accounts of the galleon trade.²⁶ Silver was not simply a form of payment; it was also a trading commodity that generated tremendous profits. Houqua’s business dealings show that different forms of silver provided arbitrage opportunities for transnational traders. In challenging simple assumptions of stocks and flows of silver, the analysis also extends to the credit market. Compared to simple aggregations of data at a national level, Houqua’s financial dealings across time and space provide the basis for a more nuanced understanding of global economic development prior to the period when Western systems came to dictate the terms for the accounting and clearance of international trade and credit.

(Continue…Outline of the Chapters)

6 A recent publication, Eric Jay Dolin, When America First Met China: An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs, and Money in the Age of Sail (New York: Liveright, 2012) brings to the attention of the popular reader the global dimension of this exchange. The present study will extend beyond the oft-cited anecdotal examples based on Dolin’s selected memoirs with a view toward building a critical understanding of the business dealings of these global traders. In a recently published monograph, Frederic Delano Grant Jr., The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780-1933 (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014), introduces a different dimension of the global influence as he traces the origins of modern banking insurance across time and space to the Canton Guaranty System.
7 Liang Jiabin, Guangdong shisanhang kao (An Investigation into the Guangzhou Hong Merchants) (1937; rpt., Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999).
8 See Dilip Kumar Basu, “Asian Merchants and Western Trade: A Comparative Study of Calcutta and Canton 1800-1840″ (PhD diss., Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1975) and Kuo-tung Anthony Ch’en, The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1843 (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1990).
There is a similar trend in the scholarship on the Western traders. Reacting against Western imperialism, Jacques M. Downs depicts the American traders operating in the Canton system by highlighting their role as traffickers in the illicit and immoral opium commerce. See Jacques M. Downs, The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844 (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1997).
9 Paul A. Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Enghteenth-Century Chinese Trade (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) and Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007). Van Dyke views the Canton system as a sophisticated arrangement through which the Qing court managed the growing trade and generated significant revenue for the court, succumbing to Western imperialism only after the arrival of Western steamships and gunboats.

10 With respect to writings on Houqua, there has been surprisingly little scholarly coverage.
Ch’en, in The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, refers to Houqua, but he does not prominently feature this successful merchant, largely because his focus is on the insolvency of many other merchants. As for Chinese-language materials, until recently writers have shunned Houqua as a politically problematic individual. His connections with Western traders called into question his political allegiance. His family’s financial contributions to the Qing state’s suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, which many Communist historians view as a harbinger of the peasant revolution spearheaded by the Chinese Communist Party in the mid-twentieth century, rendered Houqua an enemy of the masses. In contrast, English-language coverage has celebrated Houqua’s accomplishments, perhaps too much so when written from the romanticized perspective of the Old China Trade. See, for example, W. Cameron Forbes, “Houqua, the Merchant Prince of China, 1769-1843," Bulletin of the American Asiatic Association 6, no. 6(1940): 9-18.
11 For an extended discussion of this historiography, see Paul A. Cohen, China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
12 The Cambridge History of China on this period, for example, focuses on political developments and emphasizes the system of power in which the merchants were supposedly subordinate to a “corrupt" official hierarchy. See Frederic Wakeman Jr., “The Canton Trade and the Opium War," in The Cambridge History of China, eds. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, vol. 10, pt. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 163-212. Although the hierarchy in which the merchants operated under the auspices of the officials nominally underwrote the system of exchange, the trade in Canton entailed a pragmatic exercise of constant negotiations among merchants and bureaucrats over the ever-changing practices in global trade against the backdrop of the constantly shifting geopolitical landscape.
13 In 1757 Canton became the sole legal port of call for China traders arriving from the West. This system persisted until the conclusion of the Opium War in 1842, when the era of the Treaty Ports was introduced.
14 See, for example, Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973); Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990);
R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Kent G. Deng, “A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History," Economic History Review, new series, 53, no. 1 (February 2000): 1-28.
15 For studies focusing on the role of finance as a facilitating device, see R. S. Sayers, Central Banking after Bagehot (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); E. Victor Morgan, The Theory and Practice of Central Banking, 1797-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943); C. A. E. Goodhart, The Business of Banking, 1891-1914 (1972; rpt., Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1986). For an analysis highlighting finance as an independent contributor to economic growth, see Michael Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism: The United Kingdom, 1850-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
16 See Youssef Cassis, City Bankers, 1890-1914, trans. Margaret Rocques (1984; гpt., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2nd ed. (1993; rpt., New York: Longman, 2002).
17 See, for example, Kozo Yamamura, “Japan, 1868-1930: A Revised View," in Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History, ed. Rondo Cameron (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 186-197. Although he does not present his test cases as Asian models of gentlemanly capitalists, Richard Grace examines the lives of William Jardine and James Matheson against Cain and Hopkin’s model. See Richard Grace, Opium and Empire: The Lives and Careers of William Fardine and James Matheson (Mon-treal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014).
18 Paul A. Van Dyke argues that the policies of the Qing state inhibited the geographical scope of the Hong merchants’ activities. See Merchants of Canton and Macao: Success and Failure in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), intro.
19 Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella, eds., Contract and Property in Early Modern China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
20 Anne Osborne, “Property, Taxes, and State Protection of Rights," in Contract and Property in Early Modern China, ed. Zelin, Ocko, and Gardella, 120-158.

21 Hill Gates, China’s Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
22 Niall Ferguson, The World’s Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson; New York: Viking, 1998).
23 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Four-nal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 803-832, and Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
24 David Faure, China and Capitalism: A History of Business Enterprise in Modern China
(Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2006).
25 Many scholars who have analyzed trading networks have offered cultural explanations that build on the diasporic employment of social devices as the basis for business inter-actions. See, for example, Avner Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition," American Economic Review 83, no. 3 June 1993): 525-548, and G. William Skinner, “Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia: In Honour of Jennifer Cushman," in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 51-93. The diverse ethnic background of Houqua’s trading network challenges these assertions. By examining the process through which Houqua and his partners transcended cultural barriers and established their system of credit to cope with the risks and uncertainties of long-distance trade, the current research contributes to our understanding of transnational networks.
26 Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn, eds., Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003); Akinobu Kuroda, “Concurrent but Non-integrable Currency Circuits: Complementary Relationships Among Monies in Modern China and Other Regions," Financial History Review 15, no. 1 (2008): 17-36; Man-Houng Lin, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808-1856 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); William S. Atwell, “International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650," Past & Present, no. 95 (May 1982): 68-90.